本論文主要希望瞭解我國競業禁止條款對於員工的自我教育訓練投資和企業對員工教育訓練投資會產生何種影響。爰此,本論文在搜尋相關文獻分析後認為,由於競業禁止條款限制了員工轉職的可能性,進而導致其對於薪資議價權的降低,因此員工在簽訂競業禁止條款後會減少對自我的教育訓練投資,且此情形尤其在產業別特定性教育訓練投資中比共通性教育訓練投資更加明顯。同樣地,競業禁止條款亦可以保護企業的專業技術、營業秘密不至於流動至競爭對手公司,因此若企業與員工約定競業禁止條款,企業便有更多誘因對員工進行教育訓練投資,且此情形亦是在產業別特定性教育訓練投資中更加明顯。為驗證本論文以上之假設,本研究以對員工發放問卷之形式進行探討。在使用敘述性統計以及Interval Regression和Tobit Regression進行分析後,本論文發現:(1)競業禁止條款並不會對員工投資自我教育訓練的選擇造成影響;(2)競業禁止條款會增加企業對員工的教育訓練投資,且在產業別特定性教育訓練投資的影響會比共通性教育訓練更加明顯。
This paper aims to determine the impacts of non-compete clauses used in Taiwan for two types of investments in education and training: by employees themselves and by companies for their employees. Analysis of the related literature indicates that a non-compete clause limits employees’ ability to change jobs, thereby reducing their rights when negotiating salaries. After signing a non-compete agreement, employees tend to reduce their amount of self-investment in education and training. This is especially obvious for industry-specific training, compared to general training. At the same time, a non-compete clause helps a company protect its specialized technologies and prevent the circulation of its trade secrets to competitors. As such, when a company enters into a non-compete agreement with its employees, it is more motivated to invest in employees’ education and training. Again, this is more obvious for investments in industry-specific training. The survey method was adopted to verify the aforementioned hypothesis, and employees were sent questionnaires for completion. The results from descriptive statistics, interval regression, and Tobit regression indicate that the use of a non-compete clause did not affect an employee’s choice regarding self-investments in education and training, but it did increase a company’s investments in its employees’ education and training. Furthermore, there was a greater impact on investments in industry-specific training than in general training.