高階主管權益基礎薪酬績效條件使用會計表現之探討

An Analysis of Using Accounting Measures In Top Executive Performance-Vesting Equity Compensation

吳逸婷(Yi-Ting Wu)

指導教授 ： 李艷榕

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201701101

摘要

美國自1990年代中期開始，公司於高階主管權益基礎薪酬中的績效條件使用率便逐漸提高，管理者之權益薪酬須於特定期間內滿足特定績效表現才屬取得，因此衡量績效的指標必須能反映管理者之作為，所以在薪酬契約中指標的選擇有其重要性，而衡量指標中又以會計表現衡量為公司使用上的多數，因此本研究即為探討影響公司給予高階主管之權益基礎薪酬中的績效條件使用會計表現衡量的決定因素。
經實證結果後發現，高階主管在權益基礎薪酬中本來就會面臨股票波動的風險，特別是無法控制的部分(即市場風險)，因此若盈餘能夠使管理者避免面臨此市場風險，則會計表現就會被公司用以衡量績效條件是否達成。另外，因盈餘表現相對於股票表現更能捕捉管理者內部之營運及財務決策，並反映管理者特定的行為，所以當公司營運複雜程度越高(業務跨足不同產業越多)，相應的高階主管之行為及決策更為多樣化及複雜時，為合理反映其行為，公司更會使用績效條件中之會計表現衡量。
最後，因管理者薪酬為董事會所決定，所以公司治理的運作影響著薪酬制度的設計，在假說三中認為當管理者的權力越大使得公司治理較差時，董事會便比較可能會於高階主管權益基礎薪酬績效條件中以較為容易被操縱的會計表現為衡量指標，但實證結果顯示管理者的權力與使用會計表現衡量間呈正向關係但並未達到統計的顯著性，代表公司治理的監督機制可能並非影響2006-2015年間公司於高階主管薪酬的績效條件中使用會計表現衡量的因素。

關鍵字

會計表現衡量指標 ； 績效條件之會計表現衡量 ； 權益基礎薪酬 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

This study examines the determinants of using accounting measures in top executives performance-vesting equity-based compensation. Since mid-1990s in U.S., usage of performance-vesting provisions has been gradually increasing in top executive’s equity-based compensation. Performance-vesting equity-based compensation become vested only if executives achieve the performance target during the specific period. Therefore, choosing a performance measure which can reflect executives’ actions is important in the design of compensation contracts. Because accounting measures dominate in performance-vesting conditions of executive equity-based compensation, this study examines the determinants of using accounting measures in performance-vesting equity-based compensation.
Empirical results show that if earnings can filter out the noise in stock performance (i.e. market-wide fluctuations) in equity-based compensation, accounting measures are more likely to be included in performance-vesting provisions. In addition, since earnings exhibit a better ability to capture executives’ internal decision and reflect specific aspects of managerial actions, when firm’s operating complexity is higher, it is useful to use accounting measures to capture executives’ corresponding multiple actions.
Finally, I assume that boards are more likely to use accounting measures as performance vesting conditions when executives are more powerful because accounting numbers are more subject to manipulation. However, empirical results show positive but insignificant relation between the use of accounting measures and powerful executives, as reflected by higher entrenchment index and CEO duality.

並列關鍵字

accounting measures ； performance-vesting provisions ； equity-based compensation ； corporate governance

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