獨立董事制度與公股角色對我國企業經營的影響

The effects of Relationship between Independent Director System and State Owned Minor Ownership on the Corporate Performance in Taiwan

孫于軒(Yu-Hsuan Sun)

指導教授 ： 林建甫

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.01798

摘要

近年來，台灣公司治理的改革方向，是朝向設立獨立董事制度與審計委員會為發展方向，並期許其能發揮真正監督的效用，而使我國公司治理能夠與國際間機構的評比相互接軌。本研究主要探討台灣上市公司設立獨立董事制度與公司經營績效之間的關連性探討，也探討家族董事與公司績效之間的相關性，另加入代表公股角色之變數群，也擬測試其是否會直接影響企業之績效，探討獨立董事與公股角色企業之間經營績效的關聯性。本研究的樣本以台灣254家設立一席以上獨立董事之上市公司為主，研究期間為1998到2007年，本研究的實證結果得出的結論為：
一、強制性設置獨立董事在2002年設立獨立董事後較尚未設立獨立董事前的公司績效為差。
二、2002年之後，強制性設置獨立董事之企業較自願性設置獨董事之企業績效為佳。
三、獨立董事席次比例較高與企業的經營績效呈現正相關。
四、忙碌獨立董事比率與公司經營績效呈現正相關。
五、家族個人董事席次比例愈高與公司之經營績效呈現負相關。
六、曾是公營事業之公司與公司經營績效呈現正相關。
七、公股持股比率與公司經營績效間呈現正相關。
本研究經由實證結果可以推論出，獨立董事制度可以發揮監督功能並提供專業諮詢以能提升公司的經營績效，而公股民營化之後與公股董事對於公司的經營也是有相當程度的幫助，期望本研究的研究結果，對於台灣上市公司與政府對於設立獨立董事制度的決策能有參考的依據。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 獨立董事 ； 公股董事 ； 家族董事 ； 經營績效

並列摘要

In recent years, the reform of the Taiwanese corporate governance is heading toward the direction of setting the independent director system and audit committee, in the view of making the system more eligible to take its real effect of supervision so that the level of the corporate governance in Taiwan will be aligned with that of the world.
This research is mainly exploring the relationship between those companies with independent director systems and their corporate operating performances. The research further encompasses the relations between Family directors and their corporate operating performances. Besides, the variable of State Owned Minor Ownership is further added to test its effect on the corporate operating performances.
The research is sampled from 254 companies listed in Taiwan, which are built with one or more than one Independent Director, with a research period of 1998 through 2007. The research has reached the conclusion as following based on the empirical results:
(1)The corporations with the mandatory setting of independent director system after 2002 show worse corporate performance than those without the setting of independent directors before 2002.
(2)After 2002, the corporations with the mandatory setting of independent director system show better corporate performance than those corporations who voluntarily set the independent director system.
(3)The higher percentage of independent directors is positively correlated with the corporate operating performances.
(4)The percentage of busy independent directors is positively correlated with corporate operating performances.
(5)The higher percentage of family directors is negatively correlated with the corporate operating performances.
(6)The corporations which were once Public Corporations have shown positive correlation with the corporate operating performances.
(7)The ratio of the public shareholders has shown positively correlation with corporate operating performances.
According to the empirical results, the research can infer that the independent director system actually takes its real effect of supervision and offer the professional consultation to improve corporate operating performances. Furthermore, the privatization of public share and public directors contribute positively to the corporate operations. Hope that the result of this research can be a useful reference for those Taiwanese listed companies and government who wish to set an independent director system.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； independent director ； public directors ； family directors ； corporate operating performance

參考文獻

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