時間哲學中的反實在論

在近代關於時間的存有學討論中，為了增進理論的可靠度以及討論性，許多哲學家會從物理學的角度參考與切入，如此令理論不至於違背科學基礎，亦可使討論不僅是形而上的空談，或許還能成為有朝一日可被實現的想像。在人類實際發展到能成功將人們從現在送往其他時空之前，沒有誰能篤定地描述距離現在遙不可及的遠古大陸或是無垠的未來是否就是我們現在認識的模樣，於此之中的我們，除了在自己能汲取的資訊洪流中盡力捕捉真知的光輝，使生命過得更佳盈滿的方式也包含了接受在更多時候時間僅留給我們的片段枝節會比完整無缺帶來更好的結果。本文主要從達米特對過去時間的反實在論為中心，根據達米特對語言的意義採取的證實論主張，探討是否能從身處在時間之中的個體角度有意義地談論自身生命長度無法經驗到的其他時間，透過這樣的描繪能不能符合我們的日常情況？以能與人溝通的觀察者之經驗作為範圍，劃出的界線就是我們在當下獲取真概念的能力極限，這樣緊貼著個體的語言完全不同於預設了獨立存在著經驗之外有其他時空概念獨立存在的語言，而是更加聚焦於語言在群體構築出藉由交流共享而達成的社會功能。第一章的內容會簡介關於時間的存有學中幾個主要的立場，以及達米特對真概念採取的證實論主張。第二章將詳述達米特初期嘗試的過去時間的反實在論和他對實在論透過真值連結提出的挑戰做的回應，以及達米特基於其證實論主張所採取的非二值原則。雖然達米特的回應看似化解了原本認為會產生真假值不融貫的問題，但這個理論依然難以被接受，直覺上這是個完全不符合日常使用情況的語言。第三章開始到第四章，將分別介紹萊辛巴赫、帕特南、和兜勒夫對達米特初期和後期兩種版本的主張的批評，根據他們的質疑，達米特的理論不僅會在時間的存有中遇到只有自己存在的時間存在的獨我論問題，也得面對只有自己存在而不接受他心存在的獨我論困境。最後一章中，我將整理達米特並未說明清楚的，關於知識的獲取及語言的習得過程實際上被過度簡化的，使他想強調的語言的社會性無法解釋溝通時的成功傳遞概念究竟是如何開始的，以及對於來自他者證實的真概念在我們實際使用語言時，依然無法作為穩固可靠的知識基礎。但是，即便在達米特嘗試建構既符合我們作為時空中渺小一員的角度所能建立的時空概念時沒有得到既融貫又符合直覺的結果，他採取的立場反而讓許多談論的對象既非真也非假，繼而讓述句內容的意義相比二值原則的解釋方式多了許多可能性，他依舊對關於過去時間的探討造成了深遠的影響。

關鍵字

時間哲學；反實在論；直覺主義邏輯；證實論；意義理論

並列摘要

In order to improve the reliability and to promote discussion, when speaking of ontological notion on time, philosophers tend to stand by the side of physical theories, so that their ideas will not only be metaphysical, but correspond with the scientific foundation. There are even scientists who are persuaded by philosophical theories trying to realize these theories. (This may also include film directors, perhaps.) Before we could actually reach other time and space, none of us should claim that the ancient or the future world is what we know from so far. Since what could be attained by us has been too infinite, yet our ability too limited, in addition to pursuing genuine knowledge, the way to make our innermost part more content and peaceful also includes accepting that time leaves us tears and regrets no less than laughter and satisfaction. Mainly in this thesis, I focus on Michael Dummett’s anti-realism of the past. Based on his manifestation argument, justification theory, and denial to principle of bivalence, I try to organize his attempt on whether it is possible to meaningfully talk about (ancient) time from the perspective of an individual, and whether this description fit our general use of language is also taken into consideration. In the first two sections, I will introduce several main positions in the ontology of time, and justification theory adopted by Dummett. Sections in Chapter 2 will detail the anti-realism of the past in Dummett’s initial attempts and his response to the challenge of realism through truth-value link. For Dummett did not accept the principle of bivalence, even though his response seems to have resolved the challenge of truth-value link, the result is not welcomed. Starting from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, Hilary Putnam, and Yuvel Dolev’s criticisms of Dummett’s early and later versions on the unreality of time will be introduced respectively. According to their reviews, Dummett’s theory of time not only encounter the problem of solipsism of existence but present time. In the last chapter, I would summarize that Dummett did not successfully resolve the problem on how we explain the process of manifesting and acquiring truth through general language. Apparently, the key point has been oversimplified, so that neither realist not anti-realist could not give a good account of it, the key point itself may be too blurred to be illustrated, however. Even when Dummett tried to construct an anti-realism concept about the past, he failed to obtain a result that was both coherent and intuitionistic, there is still a profound influence by his discussions on the truth in time about the past.