臺灣地區自用汽車車體損失險自負額選擇與消費者特性之相關性實證研究

A Study on The Relationship of The Deductible Choice and The Characteristic of Customer of Personal Physical Damage Automobile Insurance in Taiwan

陳加利(Chai-Li Chen)

指導教授 ： 賴曜賢

淡江大學/商學院/保險學系保險經營碩士在職專班/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2009.00268

摘要

自負額(Deductible)之運用，常見於保險商品中，用以解決保險人與被保險人因資訊不對稱引發逆選擇(Adverse selection)與道德危險(Moral hazard )問題。對此，學界針對自負額設定與逆選擇及道德危險間之問題多所著墨，自負額能真正解決逆選擇及道德危險對保險人經營績效的為害？其結果卻莫衷一是。
本研究有兩大重點；一、跳脫舊窠臼，擷取國內知名產險公司承保自用車體損失險(Personal Physical Damage Automobile Insurance)之實證資料，研究同一承保險種，消費者選擇自負額高低之消費特性行為，本研究大膽假設臺灣地區(不含澎湖、金門與馬祖之外島)消費者為移轉風險者，面對同一承保保單時會選擇較低自負額水準以移轉風險。二、於固定自負額水準時，對消費者選擇保障險種高低因子之相關性加以分析，即對影響消費者決定其購買車體險險種之可能因子做探討。
藉由多元迴歸模型之實證研究，擷取從人、從車、業務來源及損失頻率、損失幅度、保費及續保與否等十二變數，分析同一保障範圍消費者選擇自負額高低及同一自負額額度消費者購買高低保障險種之消費特性差異。研究發現，逆選擇確實存在於臺灣地區自用小客車車體險市場，並就影響自負額選擇與險種選擇之因子加以分析及研究其相關性，並將此實證結果提供保險人發展多樣化車體損失險，及加惠消費大眾購買車體險時參考。

關鍵字

自負額 ； 逆選擇 ； 道德危險

並列摘要

Abstract
The deductible is usually used as an underwriting tool to figure out the effect of asymmetric information, which produces the adverse selection and moral hazard problem from the point of view of the insurer. Many scholars try to test its reasonableness but they cannot have a consistent opinion. This paper focuses on two topics: One is to collect a lot of real data from local non-life insurance company in Taiwan and test the insured tendency to select the deductible level and the type of policy’s coverage, to find how the deductible level and insuring coverage to affect consumer's purchasing behavior. In the research we assume that consumers intend to select the policy with lower deductible and wider coverage to avoid their risks, as type A policy in automobile damage policy. The other topic is to try to analyze the consumer's purchasing behavior of car insurance contract when fixing deductible level。
According to the Multi-Logistic Regression model test, it is realized that the consumers certainly tend to select a policy with wider coverage and lower deductible level. Thus, it may be to reason that the adverse selection certainly exists in the Taiwan market of physical damage automobile insurance.

並列關鍵字

Deductible ； Adverse selection ； Moral hazard

參考文獻

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