中國「一帶一路」政策推動進展探析—以中東歐國家為例

2013年中國國家主席習近平於中亞四國進行國事訪問訪問及出席亞太經濟合作組織高峰會非正式會議期間，提出了「一帶一路」（「絲綢之路經濟帶」和「21世紀海上絲綢之路」）戰略構想，視該倡議對內賦予「促增長，調結構」經濟期望，對外建構以中國為主角之區域經濟體，並抗衡以美國為首之西方勢力圍堵戰略。鑑於「一帶一路」的內涵可歸納「政策溝通、設施聯通、貿易暢通、資金融通、民心相通」（「五通」），故沿線國家對中國反應與態度轉變至關重要，因本論文置重在中東歐國家「16+1」合作機制，故首先必須要先從「歐洲」此一大框架談起，歐洲作為已開發市場代表，加上歐盟多年來是中國第一大貿易夥伴，在「一帶一路」建設中占據重要且特殊地位，但目前對「一帶一路」建設出現東西歐差異明顯，南北歐各有側重，且歐洲企業和城市（或地方）較積極參與「一帶一路」建設，而精英和民眾對「一帶一路」倡議認知和參與分歧，加以目前中歐經貿摩擦衝突、歐洲保護主義抬頭、歐洲一體化前景不定等風險壓力影響，亦連帶著影響到中國與中東歐國家「16+1」。回顧中國與中東歐國家合作機制發展脈絡，可劃分為2011年至2012年係倡議草創期，接著2012年至2017年為升溫黃金期，期間雙方每年舉辦領導人會晤，並加速如中歐班列之設施聯通，希臘的比雷埃夫斯港（Piraeus）、蒙特內哥羅的南北高速公路項目、匈塞鐵路（匈牙利首都布達佩斯到塞爾維亞首都貝爾格勒）項目、克羅埃西亞的佩列沙茨跨海大橋專案等主要基礎設施建設陸續完工，貿易規模也有所進展，2020年中國與中東歐17國貿易首次突破千億美元，資金融通方面也分別有「中國—中東歐投資合作基金」、「中國─中東歐銀行聯合體」等平台支援。然2018年迄今進入瓶頸磨合期，由於「一帶一路」在中東歐面臨來自歐盟、美國等外部大國政治阻力，內部合作則出現貿易占比仍低且結構出現失衡、投資不均且不符期待出現落差、過多承諾未能到位淪空頭支票、「債務陷阱」論調增強不利持續合作、人權與民主意識形態歧見加深等齟齬，顯示當前中國與中東歐國家合作已邁入深水區，此時期將持續多久，該合作機制是否會進入新發展階段，均尤值吾人關注。

關鍵字

一帶一路；歐盟；中東歐國家；「16+1」合作機制

並列摘要

In 2013, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the four Central Asian countries and the informal meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit, he proposed “OBOR”, known as One Belt (Silk Road Economic Belt) and One Road(21st Century Maritime Silk Road), regarding it as “promoting economic growth and adjusting industrial structure” internally, as well as externally shaping China as the regional economic leading role, and countering the containment strategy of Western forces led by the United States. The connotation of OBOR is a systematic project involving five major goals: “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bond” which should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all and efforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road. My thesis emphasized on the “16+1” cooperation mechanism in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), so basically the European framework about OBOR can’t be neglected. While Europe is the representative of the developed market, and the EU has been China’s largest trading partner for many years which occupies an important and core position in the construction of OBOR. However, there are obvious different opinions between Eastern and Western Europe in the construction of OBOR, and the Southern and Northern Europe have their own priorities, and European companies and cities (or places) are more motivated in participating in the construction of OBOR, the elites and the public have diverse views of participation in OBOR, coupled with the current Sino-European economic and trade frictions and conflicts, rising European protectionism, uncertain prospects for European integration and other risks and pressures have also affected “16+1” cooperation mechanism with CEECs. When we retrospectively look at the development of the cooperation mechanism between China and CEECs, it can be divided into three periods. Firstly, the initial period of initiative begins from 2011 to 2012, and secondly came the golden period of warming up from 2012 to 2017. During this period, the two sides held annual leaders’ meetings and accelerated the connection of facilities such as China-Europe freight train. Piraeus Port in Greece, North-South Expressway Project in Montenegro, Hungary-Serbia Railway Project, Peljesac Sea-Crossing Bridge in Croatia and other major infrastructure constructions have been completed one after another. In 2020, trade between China and CEECs exceeded US$100 billion for the first time. In terms of financial integration, there are mechanisms such as “China-CEE Investment Fund”, “China-CEE Inter-Bank Association” that supported the financial flows. Nevertheless 2018 has been a bottleneck period so far. As OBOR in Central and Eastern Europe has faced political resistance from external powers such as the EU and the United States, internal cooperation has seen a still low trade share, structural imbalances, uneven investment, and a gap that does not meet CEECs’ expectations, also too many empty promises, the “debt trap” argument has haunted the continuous cooperation, and the ideological differences between human rights and democracy have deepened. Consequently, the current cooperation between China and CEECs has entered a deep-water zone. No one knows how long exactly will this period last whether this cooperation mechanism will enter a new stage of development is worth our noticing.