Zahavi詮釋之胡塞爾的超越論互為主體性與客體關係理論之關聯

丹麥學者Dan Zahavi認為胡塞爾不是一個獨我論者(solipsist)。對胡塞爾而言，只有當我們真正考慮到互為主體性 (intersubjectivity)，才能理解超越論的觀念論之真正意義。客體關係理論是從佛洛伊德的精神分析理論發展出來的，相較於傳統精神分析理論的「一人心理學」--分析師專注於對個案的困境現象做詮釋，客體關係理論則是「兩人心理學」--強調心理現象(psychic phenomena)是情境脈絡性的(contextual)，是個案與分析師彼此的參與和共構。本論文採取Greenberg 與Mitchell所界定之廣義的客體關係理論--只要是源於佛洛伊德驅力理論的客體概念的理論，均屬之，本論文試著探討Kohut, Malther, Atwood及 Stolorow，與Togashi等廣義客體關係理論學者的臨床發現之經驗性的觀點，與Zahavi所詮釋之胡塞爾的超越論互為主體性的相容性，以及這些實證發現可用以補充現象學的描述，並說明自我與他者之間動態的關係。此外，本論文不是要作胡塞爾超越論的互為主體性與客體關係理論之關係性的橫向比較，而是要作上下的縱向說明，客體關係理論屬於較上面的層次，超越論現象學屬於較下面、底層的層次，由於客體關係理論受到經驗、以及自然科學態度的影響，還是會受到其方法的束縛，沒有辦法達到超越論的層次，超越論的層次就是從底層去找到最原初的經驗的明證性，所以客體關係理論需要敞開，從底層去挖掘，才會有無盡的源泉。

關鍵字

超越論的；互為主體性；自我/自體；同理共感/神入；客體關係理論

並列摘要

Danish scholar Dan Zahavi argues that Husserl is not a solipsist. For Husserl, we can only really understand the full and proper sense of transcendental idealism the moment when intersubjectivity is taken into consideration. Object relations theory is developed from Freud's psychoanalytic theory. In contrast to the "one-person psychology" of traditional psychoanalytic theory, where analysts focus on interpreting clients’ phenomena of dilemma; object relations theory is “two-person psychology” --emphasizing that psychic phenomena are contextual, the client and the analyst are mutually participated and co-constituted. This thesis adopts a broader definition of object relations theory by Greenberg and Mitchell-- as long as a theory of object concept is derived from Freudian drive theory, it belongs to the broader definition. In addition, the thesis is an attempt to explore the compatibility of Kohut’s, Malther’s, Atwood and Stolorow’s, and Togashi’s broader definitions of object relations theories and their empirical viewpoints of clinical findings, along with Zahavi’s interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental intersubjectivity. Such empirical findings can be used to complement the phenomenological description and to illustrate the dynamic relationship between self and other. Moreover, the thesis is to make a “vertical” explication, rather than a “horizontal” comparison between Husserl’s transcendental intersubjectivity and object relations theory. Object relations theory belongs to a higher level, while transcendental phenomenology belongs to a lower level, substrates. As object relation theory is influenced by experiences and attitudes of natural science, it is still bound by its methods, and it is impossible to attain a transcendental level. If object relations theory wishes to find abundant resources, it needs to open to the transcendental level, which finds the original self-evident experiences from the substrates.