自2002年初起,恩隆(Enron)、世界通訊(WorldCom)等公司,紛紛因財務報表造假而導致公司倒閉,使得公司之員工及市場上之投資人,蒙受鉅大的損失。在這些企業倒閉的案例中,公司給付會計師事務所之總公費中,非審計服務部份常佔半數以上之比例,因此啟發外界對於會計師為受查公司提供非審計服務影響其超然獨立疑竇。本文以美國市場為研究對象,利用標準普爾500(S&P 500)之公司為分析樣本,測試審計公費收入之比重對於盈餘管理及市場報酬間之關係。實證結果發現,非審計公費收入與盈餘管理幅度呈顯著之正向關係,與市場報酬呈顯著之負向關係,顯示會計師對受查公司提供非審計服務,當非審計公費比重愈高時,會計師可能因受限於來自客戶的壓力,或欲賺取特定準租,在不想失去客戶之情形下,給予其在會計事項認列上較高之裁量權;而投資人認為當會計師為受查公司提供非審計服務時,若非審計公費所佔比重愈大,對會計師之獨立性傷害也就愈大,且投資人會將其看法反映至市場報酬上。
Since the beginning of 2002, Enterprises like Enron and WorldCom etc. went bankruptcy because of the fraudulent in their financial statements, which leads to their employees’ and investors great loss. In these bankruptcy cases, the market participants found that the proportion of non-audit services fee were usually more than half of the total audit fees. They wondered if auditors provide non-audit service to their auditees, the auditors’ independence would be impaired. This paper is based on the American market, using S&P 500 companies as the sample firms, and examines the relation between non-audit fees and earnings management and between non-audit fees and market-based returns respectively. The empirical result indicates that non-audit fees have significant positive relationship with earnings management, and significant negative relationship with market-based returns. It suggests that the more non-audit fees, CPA firms have higher tolerance for earnings management. This is because auditors may have more pressure from their clients, or would like to earn specific quasi-rent when providing non-audit services to auditees. The market-based returns would be decreased as the proportion of non-audit fee because market participants consider that the more non-audit fees, the more harmful to auditors’ independence.