經理人管理誘因與資本結構之實證研究

An Empirical Examination between Managerial Incentives and Leverage Ratio

陳詩傑(Shih-Chieh Chen)

指導教授 ： 盧秋玲

元智大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2007年)

摘要

本篇論文驗證Douglas(2006)文獻當中關於經理人管理誘因與資 本結構的理論假說，實證結果發現公司資本結構與投資機會存在顯著正向關係。此外，低度舉債的公司有較高的管理誘因，此結果支持當公司具有高投資機會的時候，降低舉債可以確保有效率的執行經理人薪酬契約的假說。最後，我們也發現以股票為基礎的經理人薪酬契約與以現金為基礎的經理人薪酬契約有不同的激勵效果，特別是對公司前一期的投資機會、經理人持股以及公司規模而言有相當顯著且一致的效果。

關鍵字

管理誘因 ； 資本結構 ； 投資機會

並列摘要

This paper provides empirical evidence of a relationship between managerial incentives and leverage ratio based on Douglas’s (2006)theoretical hypotheses. We find evidence that there is positively significant relationship between firms leverage and investment opportunities and managerial incentives increase with low leveraged firms, which support our hypothesis that leverage ratio should lower to
ensure efficient compensation scheme when investment otcome is high. We also find the different incentive effect between stock-based compensation and cash-based (earning-based) compensation, such as the coefficients of one lagged investment opportunity, CEO ownership and firm size.

並列關鍵字

Managerial incentive ； Leverage ratio ； Investment opportunity

參考文獻

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