審計品質與公司績效

Audit Quality and Firm Performance

陳玫均(Mei-Chun Chen)

指導教授 ： 李詩政

元智大學/管理學院/會計學系/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6838/YZU.2008.00068

摘要

本研究的主要目的是在探討審計品質與公司績效兩者之間的關係。在過去審計領域的文獻裡，Beatty(1989)探討初次上市櫃公司(IPO)本身特有的風險與其對會計師所提供的審計品質選擇之關聯性研究，其研究發現:初次上市櫃公司會藉由付出較高的審計公費來購買會計師的聲譽資本，並透過會計師的聲譽及高品質查核的財務報表來釋出相關有利資訊及消弭投資大眾對公司營運上的疑慮，使其股價較不易被嚴重低估。本研究依循此論點，將樣本擴及至一般公司(扣除金融產業)，並以Panel data的資料型態，探討審計品質的高低是否也能在一般公司釋放出不同的訊息，進而反映在資本市場上。本文採用三種不同的股價報酬來衡量公司績效，且分別以事務所規模、審計公費、事務所規模與審計公費的交乘項來代表審計品質。實證結果顯示：受四大會計師事務所查核的公司，其股價報酬較高；付出較高的審計公費且同時被四大會計師事務所查核的公司，亦有較高的股價報酬。本研究發現：在過去IPO文獻中,所提出會計師的聲譽對公司價值所產生的正面效果，在北美的上市公司亦同樣適用。

關鍵字

審計品質 ； 審計公費 ； 公司績效 ； Panel data 模型

並列摘要

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between audit quality and firm performance. Auditing literature have discussed the valuation effects of selecting a credible auditor for the IPO. Beatty (1989) tests the relationship between auditor reputation and the characteristics of IPOs. He argues that the market’s perception of the audit quality is valuable to firms and shows significantly lower underpricing for IPOs which are audited by reputable auditors. According to this argument, we broaden the sample to include non-IPO firms, adopt the panel data regression models, and then examine whether firms wish to signal favorable information will demand for a higher quality audit by purchasing the reputation capital of auditors. We use three measures of stock returns to proxy for the firm performance and three measures which are auditor size, audit fees, and the interaction between both of them, to represent unobservable audit quality. Our empirical results show that firms audited by large auditor size or audited by prestige auditors and pay more audit fees simultaneously will have better stock price performance. We document that the auditor reputation effect not only occurs in the IPO market but also applies to our sample of North American public firms.

並列關鍵字

Audit quality ； Audit fees ； Firm performance ； Panel data model

參考文獻

1. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,1994, AICPA Professional Standards as of June 30, 1994, Chicago: Commerce Clearing House.

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5. Bar-Yosef, S., and J. Livnat, 1984, Auditor Selection: An Incentive-Signaling Approach, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 14, 301-309.

6. Beatty, R.P., 1989, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing if Initial Public Offerings, The Accounting Review, Vol. 64, 693-709.

7. Beck, P.J., and R.M. Barefield, 1986, An Economic Analysis of Competitive Bidding of Public Sector Audits, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 5, 143-165.