分析師的預測偏誤與未來預測準確度之關係:以CEO內部交易為例

The Effect of Analysts’ Biased Earnings Forecast Before CEO trading on Analysts’ Ex post Forecast Accuracy

邱慶容(Ching-Jung Chiu)

指導教授 ： 夏侯欣榮

元智大學/管理學院/商學碩士班(財務金融學程)/碩士(2012年)

摘要

本文主要討論在Regulation FD法案通過後，分析師會不會依然發佈偏誤的預測來討好管理當局，以獲得更多私有資訊來提升自己的預測準確度。本文藉由2003到2009年間S&P500公司的CEO賣股票的樣本，研究分析師是否在接近盈餘宣告日前故意調整預測使CEO在盈餘宣告日後賣股票獲利，且這些偏誤的分析師在之後的盈餘準確度會比其他同業相較來的準確。研究結果顯示，這些偏誤的分析師的確在日後的盈餘準確度會比其他同業來的好。

關鍵字

分析師預測偏誤 ； 分析師預測準確度 ； 內部關係人交易

並列摘要

Analysts are often asserted to issue biased forecast to please firm in order to get more private information and make their forecast more accurate. However, after Regulation FD announced in Oct 2000, it limits the communication between management and analysts. In this study, we observe S&P 500 companies from 2003 to 2009. We particularly pick up CEO selling stock event in post earnings announcement and examine whether analysts will issue biased forecast in pre earnings announcement and the analysts’ ex post forecast accuracy. The result from our study is that we find out analysts who issue biased forecast closer to earning announcement date will have more accurate earnings forecast.

並列關鍵字

analysts’ forecast bias ； earnings forecast accuracy ； insider transactions

參考文獻

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