本文欲檢驗薪酬委員會之監督效果(Compensation Committee Quality, CCQ),即台灣主要經理人 的薪資是否因其設立而更加合理與透明化,並觀察主要經理人認股選擇權價值及公司未來績效的相關性。考量資料配適度等因素,將對Sun et al. (2009)的二階段最小平方法模型稍作修正。此外,欲以不同定義之公司未來績效檢視,故擴增被解釋變數,分別為資產報酬率(ROA)及股東權益報酬率(ROE)。並另以處理效果模型(Treatment Effect Model),檢驗認股選擇權之使用,是否有助於公司未來價值提升。結果可發現薪酬委員制度未臻成熟,變數CCQ尚未有顯著正面效果;而認股選擇權制度受限於員工分紅費用化,使得企業使用意願下降,對公司未來績效反而為負面影響;而兩者間交互作用,則未有顯著影響力。
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the establishment of compensation committee improves the corporate governance by measuring the effectiveness of the compensation committee quality (CCQ) for top managers’ stock option grants and future firm performance. Since the information disclosure difference in Taiwan, we apply the data of top managers instead of CEO. The two stage least squares (2SLS) model from Sun et al. (2009) will be adjusted to fit the disparate status. Furthermore, we consider ROA and ROE as multiple types of future performance and apply the treatment effect model to detect using stock option grants will bring out different future firm performance or not. To sum up, CCQ performs not well due to the immature mechanism and it seems that the stock option grants bring out negative effect to future firm performance because of the policy of “Expensing employee bonus” which started from 2008.