本論文從一個很小的問題開始:Allison在其詮釋第一《批判》的經典—《康德的先驗觀念論》把〈先驗辯證論之附錄〉裡的理性假設運用等同於歸納。筆者認為此詮釋與第一《批判》裡的脈絡並不相符。儘管理性假設運用尋找普遍者的歷程和歸納極為相似,但其本質與後者不同的。若因歷程相似即把它們等同,則會忽略理性假設運用本身的特性和意義,以及系統統一性在其中所扮演的角色:理性假設運用和系統統一性無非是聯結成一個合目的的系統,讓特殊者安置在其中。對此,爲了釐清這個問題,我們將會分析“歸納”、“理性假設運用”以及“系統統一性”之特性與它們之間的關係,來回應Allison的詮釋之問題。
This master’s thesis originates from an attention to a delicate interpretation: In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, his classic work of interpretation of Kant’s first Critique, Allison claimed that the hypothetical use of reason in the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” is identical to induction. In my perspective, this interpretation would be incoherent with the overall understanding of first Critique. The hypothetical use of reason and the induction are similar in their process of searching the universal but essentially different in their natures. To regard these two as identical merely based on their similarity in the process is to neglect the nature and the significance of the hypothetical use of reason. Furthermore, the systematic unity plays a crucial role in the hypothetical employment of reason: together they form a purposive systems in which the particular is arranged according to purpose. Therefore, I restate my position that the hypothetical use of reason is not identical to induction. In this thesis, respective analysis of the induction, the hypothetical use of reason, and the systematic unity along with their correlation would be carried out in order to present an alternate interpretation in response to Allison’s perspective.