公司治理與資訊揭露程度之關聯性研究

A Study on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Information Disclosure

丁映汝(Ying-Ju Ting)

指導教授 ： 胡為善

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200500224

摘要

摘　要

若股東與管理階層間的目標對立或股東無法瞭解管理階層的行為則產生代理問題。而資訊揭露可有效降低管理當局與股東間之資訊不對稱，並提高資訊揭露的透明度以作為監督管理當局的機制。
因此本研究針對董事會、股權結構、資本密集度等公司治理因素，探討其對資訊揭露程度的影響。並探討自民國92年5月建置的「資訊揭露評鑑系統」成立後，年報資訊揭露是否有提升效果。
本研究實證結果如下：
1. 91及92年度之資訊揭露程度皆以強制性項目較高。
2. 民國91年與92年揭露分數的比較，92年總分平均數25.07較91年23.04略高。
3. 根據檢定結果，機構投資人與外資投資人的持股比例、公司規模與資訊揭露程度呈顯著正相關，而董事長兼任總經理與資訊揭露程度呈顯著負相關。

關鍵字

代理問題 ； 公司治理 ； 資訊透明度 ； 資訊揭露

並列摘要

Abstract

If the shareholders have a conflict with the management level or if the shareholders do not agree to the managers action, then it will cause agency problem. Actually, the information asymmetry can be reduced by increasing the disclosure of information. Moreover, the managers can improve the transparency of information in order to serve as a mechanism of supervizing the administrators.
This work attempts to explore the impact of the factors of corporate governance, such as the board of directors, the structure of stockholders and the capital intensity, on the disclosure of information. This investigation also examines the improvement of the disclosure of information upon “Information Transparency and Disclosure Rankings System”(ITDRS), which has been established since May of 2003.
The empirical results are summarized as follows:
(1) This study finds that, during the period from 2002 to 2003, the extent of the disclosure of information is higher for the compulsory items than for the noncompulsory terms, but the explanatory power is still very weak .
(2) The finding indicates that the score of the disclosure of information is 25.07 in 2003, which is higher than that of 23.04 in 2002.
(3) The empirical results show that the percentage of institutional investors and that of foreign investors to total investors, and firm size have a positive relationship with the extent of the disclosure of information. However, the factor of Chairman of the Board pluralisticly serving as a CEO has a negative relationship with the extent of the disclosure of information.

並列關鍵字

Agency problem. ； Corporate governance ； Information disclosure ； Transparency of information

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