摘要 近年來國際金融風暴接連發生,各國政府也接連對公司治理的討論日益增加。安隆案及博達案於美國及我國爆發之後,兩國皆對於公司治理法制化的主要目標在導入獨立董事專業性於公開發行公司中。美國聯邦證券管理委員會(SEC)對於獨立董事會計財務專業性方面需為直接與會計及審計相關職務之經驗達五年以上或達五年以上者,其相關職務為主要管理階層達五年以上;我國於2006年制定董事會中需設置獨立董事,並規定獨立董事中至少有一人要具會計財務專業性,定義為具備五年以上之商務、財務、會計工作經驗、或相關科系之公私立大專院校講師以上或領有會計師執照。兩國規定為至少一位以上會計財務專家之獨立董事,本研究欲進一步了解公司願意多聘請會計財務專家獨立董事之動因。本研究使用我國與美國兩國專業性之定義,探討財務表現不佳而使得訴訟風險較高的公司,是否可以透過建立獨立董事的專業性,而使訴訟風險降低?公司治理機制良好的公司,是否會透過聘請會計財務專家任職獨立董事期望能增加公司治理程度?為本研究想探討的兩個假說。 結果發現,訴訟風險越高的公司,較不多聘請使用我國法規定義下之會計財務專家,但會更願意多聘請使用SEC定義下之會計財務專家,在使用三種不同的訴訟風險衡量方式下,其結果係因我國與美國對於會計財務專家立法定義之異,故在不同程度訴訟風險考量之下,公司聘請之意願會產生差異。因此,訴訟風險越高公司,會願意聘請具有專業資格證明的會計財務專家為其獨立董事。而相對於未設立獨立董事之公司,已設立獨立董事之公司藉由法制的強制性已經相對的增加對公司治理的程度。在公司治理的結果方面,在模型中皆為正向顯著。公司治理指標較佳的公司,更願意聘請具會計專業性之獨立董事來加強公司治理,且願意聘請具會計財務實務專業性之獨立董事的動機為較不具會計實務專業性之獨立董事的三倍。本研究從實證結果發現,就專業性上來衡量,具實務專業性之會計財務專家除有公信力的認證外,更需要的是實務商業市場經驗的累積,因此在訴訟風險越高及公司治理越好的公司越傾向聘請具實務專業性之會計財務專家。
Abstract In recent years, financial crisis happened one after another. The importance of corporate governance has been emphasized. The main objective of corporate governance is to appoint independent directors into the board of directors of the public company by promulgation. Firms are required to appoint independent directors, and at least one with accounting financial expertise, defined as having five or more years of working experience in the business, financial, accounting area, public or private College lecturer in related departments, or persons with a CPA license. In our study, we use the different definition of accounting financial expertise in Taiwan and that in U.S. to examine whether companies with poor financial performance reduce their litigation risk through the appointment of more than one independent director with accounting financial expertise. In addition, we also hypothesize that companies with good corporate governance are more willing to appoint independent directors with accounting financial expertise. The results showed that companies facing higher litigation risk would not willing to employ more than one accounting financial experts under the definition of accounting financial experts in Taiwan’s regulations, but would be more willing to employ more than one accounting financial experts under the US definition of accounting financial expertise. Using three different measures of litigation risk, we found that firms facing higher litigation risk would be more willing to appoint more than one accounting financial expert under both definitions. The result was due to different legislative requirements of accounting financial expertise of these two countries. The empirical result also shows that companies with better corporate governance are more willing to appoint more than one accounting financial experts as independent directors. This research suggests that companies take into considerations the needs of appointing practical professional accounting financial experts as independent directors while facing higher litigation risk or with strong corporate governance.