經理人政治關聯與進入政府鼓勵性產業的後果：中國上市公司為例

The Consequence of CEO Political Connections and Encouraged Industries:Evidence from Listed Companies in China

黃晴偉(Ching-Wei Huang)

指導教授 ： 陳玉麟

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201600756

摘要

本文以中國企業政治關聯的治理框架，結合進入鼓勵性產業之議題，研究與經理人強制離職之關聯。本文發現，有政治關聯並進入鼓勵性產業的經理人不太可能被強制替換。

關鍵字

政治關聯 ； 鼓勵性產業 ； 經理人變更

並列摘要

This paper investigates the issue of forced CEO turnover in China and summarizes the economic consequences of political connections and entering encouraged industry. This paper finds that the interaction between political connections and entering encouraged industry is negatively associated with forced CEO turnover.

並列關鍵字

Political Connections ； Encouraged Industries ； CEO turnover

參考文獻

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