「後金融危機」泰國金融體制整建的政經分析：官商金融資本關係的觀點

1997年中期泰國金融危機在經濟學家與政治決策者引起不小的震撼，本文的問題意識為泰國在『後金融危機』的金融體制整建上，官商資本的關係「如何」繼續影響泰國金融體制整建。總體而言，泰國的政治行為者─王室、軍人、官僚、財團，ㄧ直以來都是十分獨特的利益集團，各行為者皆會力阻其他的行為者進入利益分配的圈子。而每次的政變成功，都將使後繼者廢除憲法，重新制定新的議程，這種完全廢憲與頒布新憲法都是依當權者的權力意志宰制。因此，對官商金融核心利益的根源，仍無法解決。當王室、軍人、官僚、財團所涉及的權力、利益分贓不平，只會再度發生政治危機與軍事政變。是以，本文的理論發現，泰國官商關係的結構性觀點不因人而易，而是泰國國家基本權力體制與結構關係的必然產物。

關鍵字

金融危機；恩庇；金融建制；塔信

並列摘要

Thailand’s financial crisis in mid-1997 aroused a grave shock among economists and political decision makers. This thesis aims to explore how the state-business relations continue to influence the construction of Thailand’s financial regime in “post-financial crisis” era. Generally speaking, political actors in Thailand, including the royal family, military personnel, bureaucrats, financial groups, have long been the very unique benefit groups, in which each actor will attempt to prevent others from entering the circle of benefit allocation. Thus following a successful coup, a successor will abolish the constitution, and enact a new one, which actions are carried out based on the wills of those in power. Hence the problem rooted in core financial benefits within state-business relations still cannot be resolved. When booties fail to be satisfactorily shared among the royal family, military personnel, bureaucrats and financial groups, a political crisis as well as a military coup will occur. This research concludes that the state-business relations in Thailand do not depend on individuals --- they are inevitable products of the relations between the national power system and the structure.