政治關聯對中國上市公司閉鎖期結束盈餘管理行為影響之探究

Exploring the Impacts of Political Connection on Earnings Management Behavior after Lockups Period Expires

蔣根寧(Jang Geunnyeong)

指導教授 ： 陳慧玲

國立臺灣師範大學/管理學院/管理研究所/碩士(2020年)

https://doi.org/10.6345/NTNU202000258

摘要

私募是中國上市公司募集資金的重要管道，本研究旨在探討有大股東參與私募認購的公司是否傾向在大股東閉鎖期結束之後操弄盈餘。此外，本研究檢視政治關聯性是否會影響公司在大股東閉鎖期結束後的盈餘管理幅度。公司可以運用兩種不同的盈餘管理方法，包括裁決性應計盈餘管理和實質盈餘管理操縱盈餘。相較於實質盈餘管理，裁決性應計盈餘管理較易被會計師等外部人發現。公司的聲譽及政治關係會因而受到負面的影響。因此具有政治關聯性的公司傾向使用實質盈餘管理。是以，本研究檢視政治關聯是否會影響私募公司在大股東閉鎖期結束之後，使用不同盈餘管理的決策。
　　實證結果指出，大股東閉鎖期結束後，有大股東參與私募認購的公司的盈餘管理並不具有顯著性。實證結果亦發現，在大股東閉鎖期結束後，政治關聯會影響盈餘管理的幅度。此外，在大股東閉鎖期結束後，政治關聯並未顯著影響公司採用不同盈餘管理方式。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 政治關聯 ； 私募 ； 裁決性盈餘管理 ； 實質盈餘管理

並列摘要

Private placement is an important financing source for Chinese listed firms. The objective of this study is to examine whether firms whose large shareholders participate in private placements tend to manipulate earnings upwards after large shareholders’ lock-up period expires. Moreover, this study examines whether political connection increases the magnitude of earnings management after large shareholders’ lock-up period expires. Companies can use two different earnings management methods including accrual-based management and real activities management to manipulate earnings. Accrual-based management is easier to be detected by outsiders such as auditors than real earnings management. Firms’ reputation may have negatively impacts and further affect their political connection. Firms with political connection tend to use real activities management. This study also investigates whether political connection may affect private placement firms’ decision to use different earnings management strategies after large shareholders’ lockup period expires.
　　The empirical results indicate that the magnitude of earnings management after large shareholders’ lock-up period expires is insignificant. The empirical results also find that political connection increases the magnitude of earnings management after large shareholders’ lock-up period expires. Moreover, political connection does not affect firms using different earnings management strategies after lock-up period expires.

並列關鍵字

Earnings management ； Political connection ； Private placements ； Accrual-based management ； Real activities management

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