以經濟的觀點分析法律對行為人的影響：訴訟費用分攤制度及累犯懲罰的應用

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ON INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR： FEE SHIFTING RULE AND THE APPLICATION OF REPEAT OFFENDER

洪萌馡(Meng-Fei Hung)

指導教授 ： 陳恭平

共同指導教授 ： 謝修

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/經濟學系/博士(2010年)

摘要

本篇論文關注在法律制訂對行為人的影響，分別就訴訟費用分攤制度對訴訟當事人的影響，及在法律錯誤下如何應用累犯懲罰機制以提高加害人的小心水準進行討論。
本文第二章以風險趨避重新討論訴訟費用分攤制對訴訟當事人的影響。自Shavell（1982）以來，有關訴訟的文獻大多主張，與美制（American rule，即訴訟兩造各自負擔訴訟費）相較，英制（English rule，即訴訟敗方負責兩造的訴訟費用）鼓勵高價值而抑制低價值訴訟案件的發生。一個有價值的案件是指對原告而言，其勝訴機率很高的案件。但文獻的討論大多數建立在風險中立的假設下，本文則提出風險趨避行為有可能使上述此一主張不成立：當風險趨避程度顯著時，英制較美制更加抑制訴訟案件，許多價值高的案件只在美制下提出。此外，美制雖然產生過多的訴訟案件，但相較英制，可降低訴訟當事人的風險損失。因此就社會鼓勵高價值案件及降低訴訟當事人風險損失的觀點而言，美制優於英制。
第三章則討論因法律錯誤（legal error）存在而導致加害人小心水準可能過低，並且造成社會誤判損失。法律錯誤指的是法院把無辜的人判為有罪或有侵權行為，或是把有罪或有侵權行為的人判為無罪或沒有過失責任。前者稱為型I誤差（type I error），後者則稱為型II誤差（type II error）。Png（1986）提出對加害人採取小心進行補貼，而Rubinfeld 和Sappington（1987）則提出政府可藉由調整提供證據的準則（standard of proof）以及對被告的懲罰來減少型I誤差與型II誤差的損失。但在現實狀況中，很少看到以補貼加害人的方式提高其小心水準。而Rubinfeld 和Sappington（1987）的結論建立在加害人都對法官的判決有顯著影響，但實際上並不是在每個情況下皆是如此。所以本文利用累犯懲罰機制使加害人提高小心水準並在誤判損失考量下決定出政府的最適累犯懲罰政策。我們的結果發現在過失責任制下，當型I誤差成本不顯著時，單一懲罰是政府的最佳政策。當型I誤差成本顯著時，最佳政策是遞增累犯懲罰。當型I誤差成本很大時，都不懲罰反而比較好。而在嚴格責任制下因為加害人與社會成本一致，所以個人最適水準與社會最適一致，政府不需要藉由任何懲罰機制提高加害人的小心水準。

關鍵字

訴訟費用分擔制度 ； 美制 ； 英制 ； 風險趨避 ； 法律錯誤 ； 累犯懲罰 ； 過失責任制 ； 嚴格責任制

並列摘要

This thesis focuses the influence of law on people's behavior. Specifically speaking, the influence of litigation-fee shift on the welfare of prosecutors and defendants and the design of penalties for repeat offenders to raise their carefulness are discussed.
Most literature, including Shavell (1982), demonstrate that the English rule (the losing side bears all costs) encourages people to file high merit suit and discourages low merit suit while comparing to the the American rule (each side bears its own costs). The high merit lawsuit is regarded as the case with high probability of prevailing. However, this conclusion is yielded based on the assumption of risk neutral. Therefore, there is a gap about whether it can still stand when players' risk attitude is considered. This paper shows that when the players are very risk averse, the discouragement of meritorious suits is greater under the English rule than under the American rule. Some high merit suits are filed only under the American rule. Besides, litigants are worse off in bearing risk under the English rule than under the American rule. Therefore, this paper claims that the American rule is better than the English rule in encouraging meritorious suits and reducing the litigant’s risk loss.
Chapter 3 considers the case when there is legal error; the injurer can be too careless and there corresponds to a social loss due to misjudge. The legal error include misjudging innocent people as guilty or infringing ones, and misjudging the guilty and infringing people as guiltless. The former is called type-I error while the latter is called type-II error. This essay considers the design of penalties for repeat offenders to increase people's incentive for carefulness and calculates the optimal penalty scheme for repeat offenders under the balance of potential legal error. Our analysis shows that under negligence rule, when the type-I error cost is not significant; an uniform penalty scheme satisfies social optimum. When the type-I error cost is significant, an increasing penalty scheme satisfies social optimum. Under strict liability, for the incentive of potential injurer is consistent with social-cost minimum, the individual optimal carefulness is consistent with social optimum, therefore, the government does not need to raise penalty to increase people's carefulness.

並列關鍵字

Fee shifting rule ； American rule ； English rule ； Risk Aversion ； Legal Error ； Repeat Offender ； Negligence Rule ； Strict Liability

參考文獻

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (1984), “Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 15, No.3, pp.404-415.

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Howard F. Chang (1996), “An Analysis of Fee-shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: on Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11.” Journal of Legal Studies, 25, No.2, pp.371-403.

Braeutigam, R., Bruce Owen, and John Panzar (1984), “An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee-shifting Systems.” Law and Contemporary Problems, 47, No.1, pp.173-185.

Chen, Kong-Pin, and Jue-Shyan Wang (2006), “Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation with Contingency Fees.” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23, No.3, pp.519–546.

Chu, C. Y., Cyrus, Sheng-cheng Hu, and Ting-yuan Huang. (2000), “Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely,” International Review of Law and Economics 20, 127-140.