立法院對行政院課責機制之研究：以少數政府時期為例

The Study of Legislative Yuan’s Accountability over the Executive Yuan:The Case Study of Minority Governments

吳育任(WU, YU-JEN)

指導教授 ： 周育仁

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/公共行政暨政策學系/碩士(2009年)

摘要

我國憲法體制具有自動換軌機制，當總統和立法院多數黨屬於同一政黨時，整個憲政運作會偏向總統制；反之，當總統和立法院多數黨屬於不同政黨時，整個憲政體制唯有偏向內閣制方能有效運作。西元2000年民進黨執政後，由於民進黨在國會未擁有過半席次，陳總統理應任命過半數立委所支持的人選擔任行政院長，但陳總統堅持籌組少數政府的結果使得過去八年藍綠政黨惡鬥、行政立法關係陷入僵局。根據憲法第五十七條規定，行政院必須對立法院負責，反過來說，立法院能對行政院加以課責，1997年的修憲雖然取消了立法院對行政院長的人事同意權，但行政院對立法院負責的機制仍未改變。

過去學界對於課責的研究多半集中於行政課責，對政治課責的研究較少，目前尚未有人研究立法院對行政院的國會課責機制。因此，本文試圖從「課責觀點」研究我國的行政立法關係，發現到在多數政府時期，行政院對立法院負責應不成問題，但立法院恐難以對行政院課責，因為雙方高層可透過黨機器加以溝通，行政院所提的法案便可順利通過；但在少數政府時期，由於行政院和立法院多數黨屬於不同政黨，立法院反而能對行政院課責，但課責機制不一定有成效。立法院對行政院的課責機制包含質詢、預算審查、法案審查、聽證調查以及倒閣等，但我國的倒閣制度規定並不合理，且立委選舉所需經費太高，要立委提倒閣的機會幾乎不可能。不過，1997年的修憲將覆議門檻降為二分之一後，使得行政院必須和立法院多加溝通，否則立法院所通過的決議，行政院即便提出覆議也很難成功，覆議制度雖然不是由立法院所主動提出，但其反而成為少數政府時期，立法院對行政院課責最有用方式。其他的課責機制如質詢、預算審查、法案審查、聽證調查等，都有其限制，課責的效果似乎不大。

關鍵字

課責 ； 政治課責 ； 國會課責 ； 質詢 ； 預算審查 ； 聽證調查 ； 覆議

並列摘要

The constitutional system of Taiwan is an alternating system. While the President and majority in the Legislative Yuan belong to the same party, the operation of the constitutional politics would deviate to the Presidential; on the contrary, while the President and majority of Legislative Yuan belong to different parties, the constitutional system would only operate effectively with Parliamentarian deviation. After 2000, the Democratic Progress Party came into power, according to that DPP didn’t own more than half seats in the Congress, President Chen designated the candidate who was supported by more than half legislators to be the Premier. However, President Chen insisted to form a minority government and resulted to the abominable conflicts between the pan-blue and pan-green parties for the last eight years, and the gridlock between Administration and Legislation. According the Constitution, section 57, the Executive Yuan must hold responsibility to the Legislative Yuan, in other words, the Legislative Yuan is holding the censorship to the Executive Yuan. Although in 1997, the Constitutional amendment had cancelled the personnel consent of Legislative Yuan toward Executive Yuan, the responsibility that Executive Yuan holding still remained the same.
In the past, the researches of accountability were mainly focus on the executive accountability, but less political accountability. Therefore this article is attempting to study for the relationship between Administration and Legislation in Taiwan through the “perspective of accountability,” and discovers that when there is a majority government, there ought to be no problem for Executive Yuan to hold responsibility to Legislative Yuan, yet the Legislative Yuan may hardly censor Executive Yuan, due to the leaders of each sides would communicate through party mechanism, so the bills that proposed by the Executive Yuan may pass smoothly; However while there is a minority government, the Executive Yuan and majority in Legislative Yuan belong to different parties, the Legislative Yuan instead is able to censor Executive Yuan, but the accountability systems may not be effective. These accountability systems include parliamentary questions, budget and bill review, investigation hearing, and toppling the cabinet. However the institutional regulations for toppling cabinet are unreasonable, plus the expense of legislator election is too high, so to topple the cabinet is barely possible. Nevertheless, while the 1997 Constitutional amendment lower the threshold of veto to one second, demanded the Executive Yuan to communicate with Legislative Yuan more often, or is would be very difficult for Executive Yuan to veto the decision the made by Legislative Yuan. Although veto is not actively proposed by Legislative Yuan, it has become the most effective method for Legislative Yuan to censor Executive Yuan during the minority government time. Other accountability systems such as parliamentary questions, budget and bill review, and investigation hearing have their own limitations, the effectiveness of them are not as expected.

並列關鍵字

Accountability ； Political Accountability ； Parliamentary Accountability ； Parliamentary Questions ； Budget Review ； Investigation Hearing ； Veto

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