混合雙占廠商之製程創新意願

Incentives for Product Innovation in a Mixed Duopoly Market

趙汝凱(Ru-Kai Zhao)

指導教授 ： 謝修

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/經濟學系/碩士(2015年)

摘要

本論文研究混合雙占廠商的製程創新意願。全文共分五章，除第一章為緒論，第二章為文獻回顧，第五章為結論外，論文的主體為第三章與第四章。兩張分別以兩階段非合作賽局探究，在Cournot 數量競爭以及 Bertrand 價格競爭下，面對可降低單位生產成本的新技術時，廠商如何決定最適購買決策。當廠商面對新技術時，私營廠商或公營廠商何者有較高的意願購買？
第三章分析得到：當市場上從事 Cournot 數量競爭，只要購買新技術的費用不會太高，則公營廠商一定會購買，而私營廠商則不一定。我們進一步發現當私營廠商購買時，公營廠商一定也會購買，而公營廠商購買時私營廠商未必購買。因此在第三章我們得到公營廠商較私營廠商更有對新技術的購買意願，且只要購買新技術的費用不會太高，市場上一定至少存在一個購買此技術的廠商。
論文的第四章分析得到：當市場上從事 Bertrand 價格競爭時，在不同的參數區間下，公營廠商及私營廠商皆有機會成為市場的唯一購買技術者。因此我們並沒有發現公營廠商或私營廠商何者的購買意願較高。

關鍵字

混合雙占廠商 ； 製程創新意願

並列摘要

In this thesis I consider a mixed duopoly in which both the public firm and the private firm have the opportunity to adopt a cost-reducing technology by spending fixed cost. The private firm maximizes profits while the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus.
In Chapter 3, I show that the public firm can be more innovative than the private firm under some condition. In particular, it is shown that if the cost of adopting a new technology is not too high, the public firm is more innovative than the private one.
In Chapter 4, I cannot conclude which firm is more innovative than the other one. It is shown that the private firm and the public firm are more innovative under different parameter regimes.

並列關鍵字

Mixed Duopoly Market ； Incentives for Product Innovation

參考文獻

Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos. “Are the public firms more innovative than the private ones? ,” Prague Economic Papers 2008.2 (2008): 157-167.

Cremer, H., M. Marchand, and J.-F. Thisse (1989), “The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market,” Oxford Economic Papers 41:283-301.

De Fraja, G. (1991), “Efficiency and Privatization in Imperfectly Competitive Industries,” Journal of Industrial Economics 39:311-321.

De Fraja, G., and Delbono, F. (1989), “Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly,” Oxford Economic Papers 41:302-311.

De Fraja, G., and Delbono, F. (1990). “Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 4(1), 1-17.