本論文以分配理論及官僚模型為基礎,探討政治與實際需求因素對地方補助款分配的影響。本文欲檢驗的假設是:當縣市政府轄區內,有越多有影響力的立委;或縣市政府滿足特定政治條件時,該縣市政府將會獲得較多的補助款。同時,不同特質的政策利益會誘發不同的行為動機,而有不同的分配結果。在研究方法上,針對2001年至2007年,中央政府對於水利建設工程之部會補助款」和「特別預算補助款」的分配,以跨越空間結合時間序列的實證分析,檢驗不同利益特質的補助款分配。研究發現:由於民進黨為少數政府,會試圖以政策利益的分配建立國會的支持。因此,特定的關鍵少數更有能力為地方爭取利益。
This thesis is based on the distributive theory and bureaucratic model to discuss how the distributions of pork-barrel benefits are influenced by political factors and practical needs. This research tests the hypotheses that a county which has more powerful legislators, or is in certain political conditions, usually receives higher portion of allocation of program spending. Further, different types of policy benefits induce different behavior motivations; therefore, the distributions of these policy benefits will be different. By using pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis method, this research examined the distributions of different types of programs spending, interesting findings are found. Since the DPP government is a minority government, she will use the pork barrel project to build up coalitions in the Legislative Yuan. And the critical minority is then more capable to bring home the bacon.