新十號公報與高階經理人薪酬之關聯性

The Relationship Between New Revised Financial Accounting Standard No.10 and Executive Compensation.

李宜紋(I-Wen Lee)

指導教授 ： 朱炫璉

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

本研究旨在探討董事會是否會緩和經理人因新十號公報發布所造成薪酬短少之部份，使得經理人與公司利益一致，從事最大化公司價值之活動，並誠實報導公司真實之情況。本研究以存貨跌價損失作為實驗變數，輔以標準化係數判別各項薪酬組成要素對經理人薪酬之影響。研究樣本為國內上市櫃公司，共計2,528個觀察值，研究期間為2008-2009年，資料來源為台灣經濟新報資料庫。研究結果除彌補實施財會公報與高階經理人薪酬相關文獻之不足外，亦可作為公司未來在實施新財會公報下，如何制訂高階經理人薪酬之參考。
研究結果指出董事會將會緩和新十號公報實施對經理人薪酬所造成之影響，亦即相較於正盈餘而言，存在存貨跌價損失權重之調降，結果亦指出董事會並非完全保障經理人薪酬，因為經理人本身亦須對公司存貨管理策略負責，故董事會僅部份保障經理人薪酬之原因推測可能與經理人本身存貨管理能力良窳有關。另外亦以全盈餘樣本、刪除負盈餘樣本與管理當局力量觀點進行敏感度分析，結果亦與本研究主要預期一致。

關鍵字

高階經理人薪酬 ； 新十號公報 ； 標準化係數

並列摘要

The objective of this study is to investigate whether the board would shield the impact of New Revised Financial Accounting Standard No.10 on executives’ compensationfor motivating executives to take actions that promote owner welfare. I use inventory loss as an independent variable and other control variables which may affect executive compensation as explanatory variables in the regression. I also use standardized coefficient to identify the impact of independent variable on executive compensation. The sample covers listed companies in Taiwan for the period 2008-2009 and consists of 2,528 observations.Data were obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal Data Bank. The results not only can rich the insufficiency of prior literature, but also offer suggestions for practices when they design executive compensationcontracts for their companies.
I found that the board would shield the impact of New Revised Financial Accounting Standard No.10 on executive compensation. Specifically, the board would decrease the weight of inventory loss compared to positive earnings. The results also indicated that the board did not shield executives’ compensation completely. It meant that executives still need to be responsible toinventory management. In addition, the study also considered total earnings sample, without negative earnings sample, and managerial power approach sample as sensitive tests. The results of sensitive tests were also consistent with the main hypothesis.

並列關鍵字

executive compensation ； New Revised Financial Accounting Standard No.10 ； standardized coefficient

參考文獻

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