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  • 學位論文

敵意併購防禦措施之研究─以毒藥丸(Poison Pill)之種類及適法性為研究中心

Defensive Tactics for Hostile Takeover─Focusing on the Types and Legality of Poison Pills

指導教授 : 林國彬
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摘要


有鑑於目前國內介紹研究敵意併購防禦措施之相關文獻為概括、整體性地介紹,故筆者欲以美國實務上最被廣泛討論使用及公認最有效之敵意併購防禦措施─毒藥丸,以其具體運作模式、司法實務見解及法規範加以深入介紹,最後反思毒藥丸於我國法下之適用性等問題。 筆者前半部主要先介紹美國實務上如何運用毒藥丸防禦措施及其種類,並整理美國州法及司法實務上對於毒藥丸防禦措施之規範及審查標準。後半部即反觀於我國現行法制上,若目標公司欲採行美國實務上最常使用且公認最為有效之毒藥丸防禦措施時,是否可行之問題。 首先第二章就美國實務就防禦措施之分類為介紹,以助於概括瞭解美國防禦措施之本質。再者,於第三章開始,就毒藥丸防禦措施之定義、功能、優缺點、採行的機關為詳細介紹。 第四章介紹美國實務上發展出來的毒藥丸類型及其內涵,其中基本型毒藥丸被德拉瓦州法院認定為有效之防禦措施,多數州法院亦認為係有效,而實務為因應基本型毒藥丸無法抵擋敵意併購者透過徵求委託書,改選董事會後進而贖回毒藥丸完成併購之缺點,發展出僅繼續性董事長或特定期間經過後始可贖回之變種毒藥丸永久型毒藥丸(Dead Hand) 及長效型毒藥丸(No Hand),則被德拉瓦州法院認定無效。 第五章係針對美國法院於認定防禦措施效力時,所通用的審查標準:若係於敵意併購發動前,即已採行防禦措施的話,則法院即為以較寬鬆之經營判斷法則(BJR)為審查標準;若目標公司經營者係處於敵意併購發動後始採行防禦措施的話,則法院將改以較嚴格之加強司法審查(ES)為審查標準。 最後,於第六章反觀於我國現行法制下,若我國實務亦欲採行毒藥丸防禦措施的話,是否可行之問題。筆者又概分為兩類為詳細探討:1. 學習美國實務,透過發行股息之方式採行毒藥丸;2. 透過公開發行或私募具股權性質之有價證券採行毒藥丸。以我國若欲適用美國最常使用之認股權毒藥丸為例,若欲以發行股息方式採行毒藥丸,於我國目前法制應不可行。若欲透過公開具股權性質之有價證券採行毒藥丸的話,筆者認為亦不可行。筆者認為,若以私募特別股、公司認股權憑證、可轉換公司債及附認股權公司債、附認股權特別股則屬可行之方式。

關鍵字

毒藥丸 敵意併購 防禦措施

並列摘要


Chapter One: Preliminary While there are many literatures discussing the defensive measures in a general way, the author of this thesis focuses intently on Poison Pill, the most useful and effective defensive tactic in American. The author details the types, court’s opinions and related regulations about poison pills in American. Moreover, the author tries to infer the legality of poison pills in our county. Chapter Two & Three: The Classification of Defensive Tactics & The Mechanics and Features of Poison Pills In order to get a comprehensive understanding of the nature of defensive measures, the classification of defensive tactics is introduced in the beginning. Then, the tactic of Poison Pill is presented. Its definition, function, pros and cons, and the authorities adopting it are described in detail. Chapter Four: The Types of Poison Pills In America, the tactic of poison pills could be roughly divided into two types—the standards and the variations. The court of Delaware declared the basic and commonly used poison pills, Flip In and Flip Over, valid. However, these standard poison pills do not prevent a raider from conducting a proxy contest to unseat the board. As a result, the variations, Dead Hand and No Hand, were developed to make up for the defect. Dead Hand was a tactic that only the continuing boards could redeem the poison pill. No Hand was a deferred redemption pill, which was redeemed only after a certain period of time. However, the Delaware court had invalided the Dead Hand and No Hand under the Delaware General Corporation Law. Chapter Five: The Efficiency of Poison Pills The Court decided the efficacy of poison pills through the Business Judgment Rule (BJR) and the Enhanced Scrutiny (ES). If the boards of a target corporation adopted defensive tactics before the hostile takeover took action, the court should apply BJR as judicial scrutiny. On the contrary, if defensive measures were adopted after a raider attacked, the court should apply ES to examine the legality of the adoption by the boards of the target company. Chapter Six: The Legality of Poison Pills in Our Country Here, the practicability of poison pills under our domestic laws is discussed in two ways. One is granting dividends to shareholders, and the other is offering securities or private placement. It is subsequently found that adopting stock purchase pills through granting dividends and offering securities is unworkable. However, non-public offering the preferred stocks, convertible bonds, warrants, and debt with warrants are feasible ways to adopt stock purchase pills in our country. Chapter Seven: Conclusion In the author’s opinion, the useful and effective defensive tactic in American, Poison Pill, could also be used in our country in some ways.

參考文獻


林國彬,發行新股與衍生性證券之交錯─我國公司法與證券交易法之規範解釋,臺北大學法學論叢,第65期,2008年3月。
林國彬,敵意併購防禦措施之研究—以財務性防禦措施之毒藥丸為主,世新大學法學院法律學系,2008年財經法學術研討會,2008年12月12日。
劉彥皇,公司敵意併購防禦措施之研究,私立中原大學財經法律學系碩士論文,2007年7月。
朱德芳,論公開發行公司之資本結構重組與公司治理:以形式減資與私募增資為核心,臺大法學論叢,第37期第2卷,2008年6月。
林國彬,董事忠誠義務與司法審查標準之研究—以美國德拉瓦州公司法為主要範圍,政大法學評論,第100期,2007年12月。

被引用紀錄


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黃筠雅(2010)。股東平等原則之再檢討—以日本導入毒藥丸制度為啟示—〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.00898
張婉婷(2011)。美國防禦措施「毒藥丸」之研究 ─以敵意併購下目標公司董事之受任人義務為中心〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-0106201117522400
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侯旻伸(2014)。企業併購中法律盡職調查之目的及其範圍〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-2811201414222099

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