併購時董事之忠實義務與注意義務

Director’s Duty of Loyalty & Duty of Care in Merger and Acquisition

朱玉真(Yu-Chen Chu)

指導教授 ： 楊竹生

中原大學/商學院/財經法律研究所/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201100707

摘要

董事對於公司及其股東負有受託義務，而董事的受託義務包含忠實義務與注意義務。又董事是公司業務執行機關，於執行公司事務時對公司應負有忠實義務與注意義務，藉以避免董事之不當行為損害到公司利益。然而併購交易亦屬公司特殊事務，因此瞭解董事受託義務內涵，並敘明董事之基本義務為本論文之研究目的。

因併購交易影響公司甚鉅，倘若只依賴一般性規定來規範董事之行為恐有不足，因此董事於併購之決策上應施以更嚴謹的檢視標準，達到以更合理之規範應用於董事處理公司併購的事務上。在忠實義務方面，董事應避免與公司造成利益衝突。此乃藉由利害關係董事之舉證責任分配與司法審查之密度，及利害關係董事必需針對重大資訊事先揭露，作為界定董事是否涉及利益衝突之標準。在注意義務方面，董事負有建置資訊監督系統之義務，以期防止公司內部資訊不實，進而造成董事做出錯誤決策。再者，美國法為了鼓勵董事勇於任事，在合理、公平的原則下對董事所做之決策都會予以基本尊重，故將董事注意義務之過失責任標準，定以「重大過失」責任為判斷標準。

在敵意併購方面，董事有其優勢可事先得知公司內部資訊，因此在敵意併購時，董事應審慎評估該併購案是否有利益於公司，進而決定採取適當防禦措施。又董事在採取防禦措施同時，可能亦會同時耗盡公司資源，故有其必要性對董事的行為採取較為嚴格的審查標準，來審視董事所採取的防禦措施是否有利於公司。

關鍵字

董事 ； 注意義務 ； 敵意併購 ； 防禦措施 ； 併購 ； 忠實義務

並列摘要

Corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation they serve and its shareholders. These fiduciary obligations include the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Directors, the internal organ in charge of corporate management, owe duty of loyalty and duty of care to the corporation to avoid their conducts giving rise to damage to the corporation while undue operating. Contrast to daily dealings, M&As is an material and unique operation, in which, the issues of fiduciary duties of directors undoubtedly are worth the efforts to discuss.

M&As involves fundamental changes to the corporation, and it might not be safeguarded enough, solely depending on directors’ self-regulated conducts. Therefore, it is necessary to construct a comprehensive standard of making decision on M&As. Besides, creating reasonable standards corresponding to the uniqueness of the M&As is also emphasized. As to the duty of loyalty, directors shall not be involved in conflict of interest with corporation. By means of allocating burdens of proof of evidence, adjusting intensity of judicial review, requiring of material information disclosures, the judgments of conflict of interest might be illustrated. As to the duty of care, directors have duty to establish mechanisms to monitor information system which eliminate false or untrue information transmitting among internal entities and prevent wrong decisions from the board. Nevertheless, for management flexibility, board’s decision shall be respected and the due diligence at reasonable and fair principle shall be downgraded to gross negligence.

As to hostile takeovers, from the perspective of information asymmetry, directors are expected to deliberately analyze and determine whether such transactions would benefit the corporation, or take applicable defensive measure. When directors decide to fight, corporate assets might be consumed; therefore, decisions shall be examined under enhanced scrutiny, and to set a standard to review defensive measures would benefit the corporation.

並列關鍵字

director ； duty of care ； duty of loyalty ； hostile takeovers ； defensive measure ； merger and acquisition

參考文獻

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