公司治理中會計師與獨立董事功能之研究

The Function of Auditors and Independent Directors in Corporate Governance

王茂昌(Mao-Chang Wang)

指導教授 ： 邱士宗

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/博士(2007年)

摘要

本文旨在分析於建立及落實公司治理的環境下，假設企業需要採增資方式來籌資，來探討會計師審計功能及獨立董事的功能，以瞭解企業家、會計師及獨立董事的策略選擇。本文建構一個賽局模型來探討有關公司治理的議題，研究模型同時考量企業家、會計師與獨立董事之角色，並運用反向歸納法推導其均衡條件及結果。研究發現：(1) 會計師不具獨立性且獨立董事也不具獨立性(採變動薪酬制度)要符合特定條件外，僅考慮會計師之審計功能，或同時考慮會計師之審計功能與獨立董事功能，會提高企業家選擇對投資人有利之投資專案的可能性。(2) 建立及落實公司治理制度，能促使企業家誠實報導並能維持會計師或獨立董事的獨立性。(3) 獨立董事採固定薪酬制度時，則獨立董事較易維持獨立性。(4) 當獨立董事不具獨立性而符合特定條件時，仍可能減緩企業家與投資人之間的資訊不對稱問題。(5) 如獨立董事具獨立性，當企業家可獲得的私人利益越高，則能減少投資人與企業家的資訊不對稱，並有助於解決投資不足的問題。

關鍵字

獨立董事 ； 公司治理 ； 道德危險 ； 會計師 ； 賽局理論

並列摘要

The main purposes of this thesis are to discuss the function of the auditor and the independent director in the situation that the firm must fund by equity capital under the environment of building and implementing the corporate governance, and to understand the strategy choice of managers, auditors and independent directors. This thesis is derived from game theory. The research model considers the role of the manager, the auditor and the independent director.
The main results are: (1) Except the auditor and the independent director (adopts the flexible salary) do not have independence must meet specific conditions, when we consider the auditor's auditing function, or consider the auditor's auditing function and independent director's function at the same time, it will increase the manager's possibility of choosing the project that is benefit to investors, (2) Building and implementing the corporate governance, the manager will report honestly, and the auditor or the independent director will maintain his independence. (3) When the independent director adopts the fixed payoff, the independent director is easier to maintain independence. (4) When the independent director does not have independence, it may decrease the information asymmetry problem between the manager and investor effectively while meeting specific conditions. (5) If the independent director has independence, the more the manager’s private interests is, the more the contribution for solving the under-capitalizing problem.

並列關鍵字

independent director ； corporate governance ； moral hazard ； auditor ； game theory

參考文獻

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