在代理理論中,企業因規模擴大,內部結構與組織運作趨於複雜,故企業聘請高階經理人,管理公司營運,促使企業達到投資人預設之目標,而高階經理人與投資人容易產生目標歧異,甚至出現自利行為,導致企業產生不必要之損失。為避免損失、約束高階經理人行為與激勵高階經理人,企業制定誘因薪酬,以激勵高階經理人盡其所能,為企業創造經濟價值,故誘因薪酬與高階經理人之能力應有顯著相關。但在金融海嘯之際,出現高階經理人坐領高薪,但此高薪卻與其貢獻不呈正比的「肥貓問題」,故本研究以高階經理力能力與其誘因薪酬之關聯性進行探討。 另外,因國內電子產業競爭情況激烈,紅利制度在其產業中使用情況非常普遍,故本研究以電子產業為研究對象,並以2011年及2012年為研究期間,刪除資料不全之樣本與誘因薪酬為0之樣本,依循Demerjian et al.(2012)研究方法,排除干擾評估高階經理人能力之因素,進行此研究主題。根據本研究之實證結果,高階經理人能力與其誘因薪酬呈顯著正相關。
In agency theory, shareholders will hire managers to manage complex operation and reach the business goal. The dilemma will exist because managers sometimes will make his own interest rather than shareholders’, and bring about loss to entity. To avoid entity loss, entity will establish a bonus contract to make goal consist. After financial tsunami, there is a controversy which called “fat cat”. It means managers’ pay is too much, and is not consistent with their managerial ability. Thus this research is concentrated on electronic industry which adopt bonus contract common, and realize whether there is a fat cat problem or not. The research period is 2011 and 2012, and follow Demerjian et al.(2012) to avoid interruption and calculate managerial ability. The results indicate that there is a relationship between managerial ability and managers’ bonus.