企業內部監督機制之賽局分析

A Game Theoretical Analysis of Inside Monitoring Mechanism of Entrepreneur

單騰笙(Teng-Sheng Sang)

指導教授 ： 邱士宗

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/博士(2009年)

摘要

本文使用在經濟學已發展有年的組織勾結理論，以水平勾結模式，董事會 (主理人) -監察人 (監督者一) -內部稽核人員 (監督者二) -管理當局 (代理人) 四個參與者(players) ，建構一個動態賽局 (dynamic game)，探討企業監察人設立決策，及監察人與其他代理人或監督人勾結時相關行為的分析。藉此研究監察人的設置是否增加董事會的效用，及對發生勾結的參與人行為是否有節制的作用？亦研究對監察人參與勾結時對其他參與者的影響。此外，本文亦分析了董事會應如何防止監察人參與勾結。
本文所獲致的結論歸納如下：一、監察人的設置，的確可以減輕董事會在監督舞弊時的負擔。二、只要董事會給予監察人的監督之獎勵夠大，的確可以透過監察人的設置，來抑制管理當局對董事會的剝奪 (expropriation) 行為及內部稽核人員向管理當局索取暗盤 (side payment) 之行為。三、監察人參與勾結時，會降低其監督強度。四、只要監察人勾結的程度越大，管理當局的剝奪行為及內部稽核人員索取暗盤的金額，甚至會超過沒有設置監察人的情境。五、董事會給予監察人監督的獎勵必須夠多，才能防止監察人進行勾結；且當監察人的勾結程度及索取暗盤增加時，前述獎勵金的門檻也須跟著提高。六、無論董事會或監察人的監督能力，都對抑制管理當局與內部稽核人員的剝奪與勾結行為產生一定的作用。因此強化董事會及監察人在財務報表上的專業能力，應有其一定的效益。本研究之研究結果希冀能提供設置監察人的企業，在研擬監察人的相關章程，及主管機關在制訂監察人的相關法令規範時的參考依據

關鍵字

監察人 ； 勾結 ； 動態賽局

並列摘要

This paper applies the collusion theory of economics to construct a dynamic game model of horizontal collusion. In the model, four players—the board of directors (the principal), the supervisor (the monitor 1), the internal auditor (the monitor 2), and the manager (the agent) —are included to explore firm’s decision strategy in the appointment of supervisor and analyze players’ behavior under the collusion of the supervisor and manager and internal auditor. Through the model, the author investigates whether the appointment of supervisor can increase board’s effectiveness and restrict co-conspirators’ behavior. Meanwhile, the author also studies the impact on other players when the supervisor is involved in collusion. Besides, this paper also analyzes what the board is supposed to do to prevent the supervisor from collusion.

The conclusions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1. The appointment of supervisor is certainly able to reduce the burden of supervision placed on the board. 2. As long as the reward the board offers to the supervisor is great enough, the establishment of supervisor is certainly able to restrain manager’s expropriation behavior towards the board and curb internal auditor’s request for the side payment from the manager. 3. The supervisor will reduce its monitoring intensity once it participates in collusion. 4. As supervisor’s collusion goes deeper, the expropriation behavior and the side payment will deteriorate even worse than the scenario without supervisor. 5. The reward offered by the board must be high enough to prevent the supervisor from collusion; moreover, the reward must be lifted up to offset the following increase in collusion level and side-payment. 6. No matter the board or the supervisor, their monitoring competence can provide a restraining influence on manager’s expropriation behavior and internal auditor’s collusion. Therefore, to strengthen their professional competence in financial statements can create a beneficial effect on the company. The results of this research may provide a reference for firms in preparing articles related to the appointment of supervisor and for the competent authorities in establishing regulations related to supervisor issues.

並列關鍵字

Supervisor ； Collusion ； Dynamic Game

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