競租活動、工作、休閒間的時間配置分析

The Analysis of Time Allocation among Rent-seeking, Work, and Leisure.

劉啟鵬(Chi-Peng Lju)

指導教授 ： 翁仁甫

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/財政學系/碩士(2009年)

摘要

傳統多數競租文獻對競租浪費的衡量方式，大多為利用貨幣來衡量競租者的實質支出，而當我們假設競租標的為事前固定的時候，卻也因此排除了一些可能會影響競租標的的要素。我們之所以希望用其他方式衡量競租浪費的理由如下：首先，競租的標的通常是由政府所提供的，例如中央政府撥給地方政府的統籌分配款。然而政府所提供的資金預算主要是由稅收來融通的，而稅收卻也會受如工資率、稅率等的影響，但這些是傳統競租分析比較少著墨的部分。

總合言之，本文的目的是透過一種新的方式來囊括這些被忽略的要素，更進一步地探討競租的浪費，並與目前多數學者們所做的結論做一比較，以期能更精確地衡量競租所造成的社會成本，並為之後關於競租的研究開闢一新的道路。

關鍵字

競租 ； 時間配置理論

並列摘要

Traditionally, most of rent-seeking literatures use money to measure the real expenditure of rent seekers. However, when we assume the rent-seeking targets are fixed before rent seeking, we also exclude some ingredients which effect rent-seeking target. The reason which we hope to measure the waste of rent-seeking in other way is as following: the rent-seeking targets usually offer by government, just like central government’s tax redistribution fund which gives to local government by central government. However, the budgets which governments offered are paid mainly by tax, and tax is affected by wage, tax rate, etc. These are seldom mentioned in traditional rent-seeking analysis.
After all, the purpose of this article is to include these ingredients which are overlooked through a new way, explores the wastes of rent-seeking, compares the conclusions with most scholars to measure the social costs of rent-seeking more exactly, and opens up a new way for the later researches of rent-seeking.

並列關鍵字

rent-seeking, ； time allocation theory

參考文獻

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