法人董監事型態與公司經營績效之關聯性

The relation between corporate directors/supervisors and a company's operating performance

劉 嘉 松(Chia-Sung Liu)

指導教授 ： 鄭 桂 蕙

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2012年)

摘要

受全球經濟瞬息萬變之影響，企業永續經營受到嚴峻考驗，企業生存的命脈在於公司治理。有效的公司治理，則依賴「董事會及監察人」之經營策略、監督及執行，強化公司競爭力及應變能力、創造公司價值、以謀求投資人及利害關係人最大利益。公司治理良窳，源自於法律契約及健全組織結構與規範，所以「董（監）事會」是公司治理核心及關鍵所在。
我國因應政府管理投資及監督國營事業，企業為擴大經營版圖、多角化經營、關係企業之整體運作，經由立法院在政府及工商團體強烈支持，制定公司法第27條規範「法人董監事制度」，讓政府或法人為股東時有所遵循。然法人董監事之自然人代表，受政府及法人股東掌控，易濫用資金、資源分配錯誤、交叉補貼、誤導運用、產生資訊不對稱，造成道德危機及逆選擇，衍生忠實義務、責任歸屬等複雜爭議。弊多於利，嚴重破壞公司治理，長期以來引發諸多學者專家之議論。
本研究以2001年~至2011年之上市櫃公司，共計1,959家公司，實際有效樣本15,037個觀測值，探討公司治理之核心董（監）事會，以「法人董監事」為主軸，對有（無）法人董監事、集團及非集團董監事之態樣，與公司經營績效之關聯性作分析，提供政府及立法機關對於公司法第27條「法人董監事制度」是否應予保留或廢除之佐證。本研究實證結果：
一、董事會無法人董監事公司之經營績效，優於設置法人董監事者。
二、法人董監事席次佔比愈高，則公司經營績效愈差。
三、集團法人董監事席次佔比愈高，則公司經營績效愈差。

關鍵字

公司法第27條 ； 公司治理 ； 法人股東 ； 法人董監事 ； 集團法人董監事 ； 公司經營績效

並列摘要

The economic fluctuation makes company operation more difficult, and corporate governance plays an important role whether a company can run continuously. Effective corporate governance depends on strategy, supervise and execution of the board of directors and supervisors, which increases a company’s competitiveness, resilience, value, and maximize investors’ benefits. Also, proper corporate governance comes from legal contract, solid organization structure and regulation. So, the board of directors and supervisors are the core of corporate governance.
To meet government and business groups’ expectations, the Legislative Yuan (LY) made article 27 in Company Act. Article 27 allows a government agency or a juristic person to act as a shareholder of a company, and able to be elected as a director or supervisor(corporate director/supervisor). Meanwhile, it shall designate a natural person as its proxy to exercise, in its behalf, the duties of a shareholder. However, the natural person is often conducted by the juristic person, which may cause misuse of capital, resource misallocation, improper subsidies and misleading. Besides, it can result to information asymmetry, moral risks, adverse selection and disputes of loyalty and responsibilities as well. All of they are harmful to corporate governance, and are discussed by researchers and exports.
I observed 1,959 listed companies in Taiwan from 2001 to 2011, 15,037 observations totally, to explore a company’s performance will increase or decrease when corporate directors or supervisors exist. In addition, I also discover the relationship between a company’s operating performance and grouping management. I hope that my research results are helpful for LY’s decision to keep article 27 or not, and my results are below：
1.A company’s operating performance is better without corporate directors and supervisors.
2.The more corporate directors and supervisors there are, the worse the company performs.
3.The more the group corporate directors and supervisors there are, the worse the company performs.

並列關鍵字

article 27 in Company Act；corporate governance；shareholder of a company；corporate directors and supervisors；group corporate directors and supervisors.

參考文獻

林宗輝，2004，公司治理與企業績效關聯性之研究，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所博士論文。

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