公司治理機制和自願性資訊揭露間之關連性實證分析－以法人說明會為例

The Empirical Analysis of Association between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Voluntary Information Disclosure－Example for Conference Calls

王玉昌(Yu-Chang Wang)

指導教授 ： 歐陽豪

共同指導教授 ： 蕭瑞民(Jui-Min Hsiao)

崑山科技大學/商業管理學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6828/KSU.2009.00025

摘要

造成2007年迄今的次貸危機，是引發全球經濟嚴重衰退和融資成本較高的原因之一，在於資訊揭露較不透明，且股權集中於控制股東，使得資訊不對稱之問題存在於控制股東與小股東之間，所產生之核心代理問題所致。本研究即在探討公司之董事會組成與股權結構對於事後是否召開法人說明會的意願與次數之影響。實證結果發現：當公司的控制股東控制權與現金流量權的偏離程度愈大時，管理當局反而較願意召開法人說明會，對召開法人說明會影響達顯著水準，此點是與過去的研究最大差異所在，並與金成隆等（2008）的實證結果不同。而控制股東之董事會席次比率與現金流量權間或控制股東之董事會席次比率與控制股東控制權間的偏離程度愈大時，管理當局較不願意召開法人說明會，由此可知，決定法人說明會招開與否的主要因素是控制股東成員擔任董事席次之比率；此外，當控制股東成員擔任董事席次比率愈高，管理當局為控制家族成員，同時董事長兼任總經理時，管理當局召開法人說明會的機率也愈低。顯示出控制股東的股權結構愈不偏離與掌控董事會程度愈高時，控制股東為掩飾其剝削小股東與債權人之行為，因此較不可能召開法人說明會，也使得公司的資訊揭露較不透明。而公司存在次大股東時，對公司召開法人說明會的機率亦不顯著，亦即，當公司存在次大股東時，對於公司揭露之政策未必有正面之影響。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 法人說明會 ； 偏離權

並列摘要

One of the reasons incurred subprime loan crisis, triggered global economic recession, and high cost of financing from 2007 to date is due to low levels of corporate information transparency and are not motivated to disclose private information to the investing public. In addition, ownership concentrated on controlling shareholder, and they makes the agency conflicts arise between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. This problem of asymmetric information also called core agency problem. In this study, the main motives and purposes are discussed the effects of board of directors components and structure of ownership on whether managers will hold conference call and the frequency.We first explore the association between ownership structure and the likelihood of holding conference calls, an important medium for voluntary disclosure, in Taiwan. We examine whether firms are more likely to hold conference calls as the divergence rights owner decreases.The results showed that firms with greater divergence of control voting right minus cash flow rights, Instead, it appeal with more willing to hold conference call. While there is no significant effect of firms with greater divergence of control seats ratio minus cash flow right on the willing of holding conference call. Only control the divergence of control seats ratio minus cash flow rights is more likely to host voluntary conference calls. This finding is the biggest difference of the prioi study, and it is also differed with the empirical results of Chen-Lung Chin et. al.（2008）. Next, we investigate the effect of the board composition on the decision to host conference calls. We extend prior literature on board effectiveness by exploring the effect of the proportion of board seats occupied by controlling family on the likelihood and the frequency of holding conference calls. Our empirical results show that the ratio of board seats controlling by control shareholder, managers are members of controlling family, and chairman of board of directors is also CEO, are all negatively related to the likelihood to host conference calls. It shows that the more deviation and controlling rights of controlling shareholder, the less the probability of holding conference calls, in order to disguise their exploitation on the interests of f minority shareholders.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance ； Conference calls ； Divergence of Control-Cash Flow right

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