國家層級公司治理與現金持有部位之研究─以美、英、德、法為研究樣本

依據自由現金流量假說認為企業自由現金流量越多將容易產生代理問題，然而文獻指出一個國家層級的公司治理程度愈好，其股東權利將獲得較高保障且融資限制也較低，將有助於提升該國企業的公司治理，也不至於有代理問題的爭議。由於英美法系與大陸法系國家對股東權利的保障程度不同，因此本研究利用多元回歸與panel 回歸分析來檢視美、英、德、法，四個國家之公司治理程度是否會影響企業現金部位。結果顯示英美法系的國家較大陸法系的國家持有較多的現金部位，其也說明國家層級的公司治理程度愈高將可以降低企業的代理問題對現金部位的敏感性。

關鍵字

現金持有部位；國家層級公司治理；自由現金流量

並列摘要

Based on the free cash flow hypothesis, firms that have more free cash flow are prone to agency problem. However, previous empirical studies suggest that a country with better country-level governance has higher shareholder rights and lower financial constraints; therefore, it is able to improve its corporate governance and avoid agency problem. Because the level of protection to shareholders in the common-law and in the civil-law countries is different, we use ordinary least-squares regression and panel regression to analyze whether country-level governance affects corporate cash holdings in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France. We find that the common-law countries have more cash holdings than the civil-law countries. Our study reveals that higher country-level governance can decrease sensitivity between agency problem and corporate cash holdings.

並列關鍵字

Cash holdings ； Country-level governance ； Free cash flow

參考文獻

[1] Aguilera, R. V. and Jackson, G., "The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants", The Academy of Management Review, 28 (3), pp. 447-465, 2003.

[2] Baskin, J., "Corporate liquidity in games of monopoly power", Review of Economics and Statistics, 69, pp. 312-319, 1987.

[3] Bates, T. W., Kahle, K. M., and Stulz, R. M., "Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to? ", Journal of Finance, 64 (5), pp. 1985-2021, October 2009.

[6] Berle, A. A., and Means, G. C., "The modern corporation and private property", New York: Macmillan, 1993.

[7] Brennan, M., Hughes, P., "Stock prices and the supply of information", Journal of Finance, 46, pp. 1665-1691, 1991.

國際替代計量

國家層級公司治理與現金持有部位之研究─以美、英、德、法為研究樣本

全文下載

主題瀏覽