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  • 學位論文

董監事暨重要職員責任保險的公司治理角色 實證研究-以台灣上市上櫃電子業為例

The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance in Corporate Governance–An Empirical Study on Electronic Industry in Taiwan

指導教授 : 洪德俊
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摘要


Holderness (1990) 認為,就公開上市公司而言,「董監事暨重要職員責任保險」(Director’ and Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance)在公司治理上扮演一個重要的角色。O’Sullivan (1997) 則就Holderness的假說做實證,其結果大致支持Holderness 的監督(Monitoring)假說。本論文則就2004年國內619家上市上櫃電子公司為樣本,藉檢視存在於「董事會組成」(board composition)、「管理人股權」(managerial ownership)與「外部股東控制」(external shareholder control)之相關性,以探求董監事暨重要職員責任保險在公司治理上所扮演的角色。 儘管本文實證結果僅部分支持前述監督假說,然本研究不僅可視為國內首開研究D&O責任保險的公司治理角色之議題,本研究結果也提供進一步深入探討台灣上市上櫃電子業對D&O責任保險的需求。

關鍵字

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並列摘要


Holderness (1990) suggests that director’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance has an important governance role in publicly owned companies. O’Sullivan (1997) empirically tests Holderness’s monitoring hypothesis, the results generally support the monitoring hypothesis. By examining the association between board composition, managerial ownership, external shareholder control, and the purchase of D&O insurance, this paper examines the role of Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance in corporate governance of 619 TSE-Listed and Over-the-Counter Listed (OTC-Listed) electronic companies in Taiwan. Although the results merely partly support the monitoring hypothesis, this study not only can be considered an important first step in attempting to understand the governance role of D&O insurance but also provide some further insights on the demand for D&O insurance in Taiwan.

參考文獻


74. Youngman, I., 1999, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, Woodhead Publishing Ltd., Cambridge, England.
1. Agrawal, A. and C. R. Knoeber, 1996, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31: 377-397.
3. Baysinger, B. D. and R. E. Hoskisson, 1990, The Composition of Board of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, Academy of Management Review, 15:72-87.
4. Beatty, R. P. and E. J. Zajac, 1994, Top Management Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Sharing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings, Administrative Science Quarterly, 39:313-336.
5. Berle, A. A. and G. C. Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan).

被引用紀錄


簡溥銘(2014)。董監事暨重要職員責任保險、資訊揭露品質與企業舞弊關聯性之研究〔碩士論文,國立臺中科技大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6826/NUTC.2014.00045
魏梅葉(2010)。董監事及重要職員保險、公司治理與資本市場之研究〔碩士論文,國立臺中科技大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6826/NUTC.2010.00018
賴宇倢(2013)。董監責任險與投資效率關聯性之實證研究〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.11096
温哲嘉(2011)。董監事責任險保險金額與會計盈餘品質之關聯性研究〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.02740
楊以豪(2016)。董監事責任險、家族企業與實質盈餘管理之關聯性〔碩士論文,國立臺中科技大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0061-1406201618100300

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