過去有關董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱D&O保險)相關研究著重於D&O保險的需求、發展與未來展望,而本研究旨在探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險與公司資訊揭露品質,以及與舞弊發生之關聯性,並進一步檢測,保險金額高低是否影響公司資訊接露品質之高低,以台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象。由於臺灣證券交易所要求上市公司應揭露並申報其董監事責任險投保情形之評鑑完整資料始於2008年,而於2007年才有較多D&O保險的自願性申報資料,因此,本研究之研究期間為2007年至2012年。關於舞弊樣本採用一家舞弊公司配對三家非舞弊公司之方式進行配對。實證結果發現已投保D&O保險之公司其資訊揭露品質較高、發生舞弊機率較低,且D&O保險之保險金額亦與資訊揭露品質呈現正向相關。本實證結果支持投保D&O保險對董監事具有激勵誘因效果,董監事會更認真經營管理公司,使得公司的資訊透明度提升,而且能夠抑制舞弊發生機率。
Most of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O) researches concentrate on the demand or determinants of D&O insurance, or its future development. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of D&O on corporate information disclosure quality and fraud. Moreover, this study examines whether the D&O insurance coverage is associated with corporate information disclosure quality. The data was collected from listed firms in Taiwan Stock Exchange during 2007 to 2012 and the empirical results show that the companies with D&O liability insurance have higher information disclosure quality and have lower probability of fraud occurrence than those of companies without D&O insurance. There is a positive relation between D&O insurance coverage and information disclosure quality. These evidence suggest that D&O insurance provides direct incentive for corporate governance quality.