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  • 學位論文

R&D投資與明確的財務績效衡量對CEO薪酬的相對重要性:家族管理的調節作用

The Relative Importance of R&D Investments versus Explicit Financial Performance Measures on CEO Compensation: the Moderating Role of Family Management

指導教授 : 曹壽民
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摘要


鑑於企業可以藉由R&D投資與CEO薪酬之間存在較大的關連性來防止CEO投機的減少R&D投資行為,本研究以台灣R&D密集產業為樣本探討家族所有權對R&D投資與CEO薪酬之間的關聯性。實證結果發現,家族企業的CEO薪酬較多依據R&D投資來衡量而較少依據明確的財務績效指標來衡量(即ROA)。此外,相對於先前的研究結果,本研究提供的證據顯示,相較於非家族企業,家族企業投入更多的R&D且R&D效率較高。此一實證結果顯示,家族企業的薪酬結構是基於R&D的投資來鼓勵CEO從事增值的R&D投資,而不是藉由帝國主義來剝削少數股東之利益。

並列摘要


Given that firms can prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D investment by establishing a greater positive association between R&D investment and CEO compensation, this study examines a sample of Taiwan’s R&D-intensive industries to investigate the impact of founding family ownership on the association between R&D investment and CEO compensation. The results show that CEO compensation of family firms depends more on R&D investment and less on explicit financial performance measures (i.e., return on assets). In addition, in contrast to previous findings, the study provides evidence that family firms invest more in R&D and show greater R&D efficiency relative to nonfamily firms. This result suggests that family firms’ compensation structure based on R&D investment encourages CEOs to engage in value-enhancing R&D investment rather than in empire building to expropriate minority shareholders.

參考文獻


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