公司治理、企業社會責任與高階經理人薪酬

Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Corporate Social Responsibility and Top Management Compensation

陳家德(Chen Chia- Te)

指導教授 ： 劉念琪

國立中央大學/管理學院/人力資源管理研究所/碩士(2011年)

摘要

本研究目的是探討公司治理機制與高階經理人薪酬之關聯性，並由狹義的代理理論觀點衍伸至廣義的利害關係人理論，說明企業社會責任在現代的公司治理機制之下，對高階經理人薪酬會有如何的影響性。
　　資料蒐集的時間為2007年至2009年的公開財報資料，就我國上市上櫃的高科技產業公司進行回歸資料分析。研究發現，高階經理人所有權和企業社會責任對於高階經理人薪酬有顯著的正向關係，同時，董事會成員的所有權和家族控制型態的公司對於高階經理人薪酬呈現負向關係，實證結果呼應本文的研究假設。而關於外部董事會成員和CEO的雙重性，在高階經理人薪酬的影響上，則得到不顯著之關係。
　　根據研究結果，本文建議公司應該強化內部治理機制並設計設適合的薪資系統，確實反應高階經理人和組織整體的績效表現，此外，有關當局應該強化公司內高階經理人薪酬資訊的揭露程度，以確保公司治理機制之健全。

關鍵字

高階經理人薪酬 ； 公司治理 ； 企業社會責任 ； 代理理論

並列摘要

The purposes of the study here are to examine the determinants of top management compensation from traditional corporate governancemechanisms includingthe composition of boards and ownership structure. We also extend to give abroad perspective of corporate governancemechanism, which is corporatesocial responsibility.
　　Top management compensation and governance variablesfrom 2007 to 2009are collected, which is based on the secondary data of listed high tech companies in Taiwan. As our hypotheses,we find that top management ownership and corporate social responsibility positively impact on top management compensation. Moreover, board member ownership and family- controlled firms negatively impact on top management compensation. However, our study shows that outside boards and CEO duality find little evidence on top management compensation in comparison with other literatures.
　　Based on our results, we suggest firms should enforce the internal corporate governance and design an appropriate compensation system; furthermore, the authorities need to improve the degree of disclosure about top management compensation.

並列關鍵字

agency theory ； top management compensation ； corporate social responsibility ； corporate governance

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