本文主要研究台灣上市櫃公司董事會中之法人董事與盈餘操弄之關係,以Kothari et al. (2005)所建議之裁決性應計數作為衡量盈餘操弄之替代變數來探討是否與法人董事制度有關聯。研究樣本為2004至2013年間台灣上市(櫃)公司,最終樣本為12,488筆觀察值,並以多元迴歸檢驗相關假說。 研究結果發現董事會法人代表席次比例越多、最終控制股東之法人董事代表所佔席次比例越高與法人董事持股比率越高,盈餘操弄機會越大;而第二與第三大股東之法人董事代表所佔席次比率與官股法人董事代表佔董事會席次比例,則與裁決性應計數之關係未達統計顯著性。另在敏感性測試時,發現不論裁決性應計數有無取絕對值的情況,法人代表席次比例、最終控制股東之法人董事代表所佔席次比例與法人董事持股比率越高,皆有盈餘操弄的情況;然而存有官股法人董事代表之公司有盈餘向下操弄的傾向。本文之成果有助於釐清法人董事制度是否能提昇董事會效能與是否能提高公司之盈餘品質,這在未來可作為主管機關監理之參考。
This paper investigates the relationship between the system of institutional directors in the TSEC & OTC listed companies and earning manipulation which follows the suggesting model of Kothari et al. (2005) to estimate the discretionary accruals as a proxy of earning management to。The sample period is from 2004 to 2013 including all listed companies in Taiwan. The final observed values are 12488, to test related hypotheses by multiple regressions. This empirical results shows that the seat proportion of institutional directors, the seat proportion of institutional directors represented the ultimate controlling shareholder, and shareholding ratio of institutional directors are positive to discretionary accruals. It implies that institutional directors can’t restrain earning management. However, there are no relationship between the seat proportion of institutional directors represented the second and third largest shareholder and government agency. In addition, sensitivity tests found that whether the discretionary accruals is absolute or not, the results are resemble. But the institutional directors represented government agency tend to downward earnings manipulation. Our findings have contribution to understand the role of institutional directors in board operations and earnings management to be a reference for authorities of capital market.