在全球的經濟體中家族企業占有很大的比例,本研究研究樣本期間為2005至2014年台灣之上市櫃公司,以TEJ之定義判斷家族企業,並以盈餘平穩化來衡量盈餘管理行為,探討年度內之盈餘管理程度,以觀察家族企業特性與盈餘管理之間的關係。 實證結果發現家族企業與非家族股東之利益一致,不會掠奪非家族股東之利益,但在家族企業中持股比例愈高者,反而較會產生掠奪效果,且企業控制持股比率越高時,盈餘管理程度越高;董事長與總經理非同一人,但皆為家族成員時,盈餘管理程度越高,而家族企業即使成為集團後,盈餘管理程度並不嚴重;當家族企業董事會規模越大時,盈餘管理程度越低。本研究進一步觀察台灣上市櫃公司近十年來,盈餘管理程度逐年降低,可見大部份企業的財務報表品質均有改善,唯董事長與總經理均為家族成員的企業,盈餘管理改善程度有限。
Family shareholdings are very common and occupy a large portion in the world economy. Under the definition of TEJ’s family business, we measure earnings management by including earnings smoothing and discretion to study the relationship between characteristics of family firms and earnings management of Taiwanese listing firms from 2005 to 2014. We find that the interests of family block holders are of no conflict to that of nonfamily shareholders. Comparing with widely-held firms, family-owned firms do not appear to use their controlling position to expropriate benefits from minority shareholders. However, the greater the families ownership, the more the entrenchment effect happened. Firms with significant ownership of block shareholders (with control right) are less likely to manage earnings. The family firms groups do not show significant earnings management. The board size of family firms has negative relation to earnings management. The results also show that firms improve in quality of financial statements in sample period, but not for firms with chairman and CEO from family members.