策略性產能承諾與通路進入決策之研究

The Study of Strategic Capacity Commitment and Entry Decision on Channel

侯嘉政(Jia-Jeng Hou)

《中原學報》 27卷4期 (1999/12) Pp. 33-41

https://doi.org/10.6358/JCYU.199912.0033

摘要

傳統的產能模式之研究，大都視超額產能為一種有效但昂貴的策略性阻絕工具，本文進一步延伸進入阻絕文獻，來探討獨佔製造商如何透過進入前之不可逆的產能投資決策，來誘導潛在零售商加入零售通路，進而提高其利潤，並利用三階段完全資訊賽局模型以倒推法來求解子賽局完全均衡。結果發現製造商誘發潛在零售商進入零售通路之機率與零售商之固定的進入成本及其所訂的批發價格呈現負向關係，且當固定的進入成本高到某一臨界值，不管製造商再如何承諾超額產能，也不可能誘導零售商進入。但有趣的是製造商可以決定是否要藉由事前持有超額產能來降低批嶺價格，以誘導潛在零售商進入，提高通路的經營效率，進而增加利潤。和過去的研究發現不同的是，本文認為製造商在事前投資設立超額產能，在某種狀況下是可以促使下游零售商進入銷售通路。

關鍵字

策略性產能承諾 ； 誘嶺進入 ； 子賽局完全均衡

並列摘要

The conventional capacity models have been seen excess capacity as an effective but costly strategic deterrent. The present paper extends the current entry deterrence literature by considering entry facilitation to analyze that the monopolistic manufacture how to induce the potential retailer into retailing channel through irreversible capacity investment. This paper uses backward induction method to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game with complete information. It finds that the entering possibility of potential retailer is negatively related to its fixed entering cost and the wholesaling price. Moreover, if the fixed entering cost of the potential retailer exceeds the critical value, the potential retailer is impossible to inducing entry, no mater what the level of excess capacity holding by upstream manufacture. It may be in interest of the upstream manufacture to charge a lower wholesaling price by holding excess capacity to induce the entry of potential retailer in preentry stage. Unlike previous finds, this paper argues the manufacturers invest pre-commitment of excess capacity can facilitate theirs down-stream retailers to entry selling channel in some specific conditions.

並列關鍵字

strategic capacity commitment ； inductive entry ； subgame perfect equilibrium