“一個中國”兩難的“雙贏”解決方案

A Win-win Solution to the "One China" Dilemma

耿慶武(C. W. Kenneth Keng)

《遠景季刊》 2卷4期 (2001/10) Pp. 121-160

https://doi.org/10.7063/PR.200110.0121

摘要

首先，本文擬應用策略規劃(Strategic Planning)理論模型在對局論(Game Theory)架構下分析兩岸關係的現況與癥結，再就對解決兩岸關係之僵局，試圖以案例分析方式提出若干簡單分析模式與雙贏策略方案：提升「一個中國」為兩岸關係發展的終極理念目標，以奠定兩岸積極發展經濟關係的三十年時閒；兩岸的政治統合問題，應留待2030年代的兩岸人民與執政者去解決。其次，本研究將進一步研究分析兩岸經濟整合的階段與時程，兩岸經由自由貿易區、關稅同開、共同市場、單一貨幣與政策協調等幾個自然階段的經濟整合後，自然可奠定未來協商政治統合的基礎。作者認為，兩岸經濟整合的時程自今起應需時約三十年，2 030年代時的兩岸政治環境將大不同於目前，而兩岸三地的經濟與社會結構的差異亦將較目前大為縮小。當大中華經濟圈內的各種差異逐漸消失時，兩岸三地的政治統合是否仍像目前一樣地受到兩岸執政者與人民的重視，則不得而知。因此，一個不預設結論的演進與開放式(adaptive and open-ended)之兩岸整合過程與協商方式，應該是兩岸現今可知的最佳雙贏策略。

關鍵字

「一個中國」 ； 兩岸關係 ； 奈須均衡 ； 策略規劃模型 ； 經濟整合

並列摘要

This paper first applies strategic planning model under the game theoretic framework to analyze the ”One China” dilemma of the current cross Taiwan Strait relations. It indicates that the current political conflict between Taiwan and the Mainland China is in a state of Nash Equilibrium there is both sides could implement no better alternative strategies unless some of the external conditions change. It further analyzes the ”One China” strategies from China's, Taiwan's and ”Taiwan Independence's” prospective using simplified strategic planning cases. It shows unambiguously that the current China policies exercised by President Chen's government are mainly of short-term tactical nature, they are unlikely able to make any significant impact on China's strategic stance of ”One Country Two Systems”. The analysis also suggests that it is unlikely China would ever alter its position of using military power as her last resort if Taiwan declares independence. Because that ”threatening” strategy would work only if China makes every principal stakeholders (Taiwan as well as U.S.A., Japan, etc.) to believe that China is fully committed to it indeed. The paper therefore suggests that the least-cost solution, both socially and politically, is to avoid the political and ideological showdown (of sovereignty issues, for instance) and move on to pragmatic issues. The paper thus proposes a ”win-win” strategy of espousing an adaptive and open-ended process toward the economic integration of Hong Kong, Macao, the Chinese Mainland, and Taiwan (the so called Greater China). Using experiences of North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union as analogies, this paper estimates that it would take about another thirty years for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to consolidate their economic systems as well as their social structures.

並列關鍵字

One China issue ； Cross-strait relations ； Nash Equilibrium ； Strategic Planning Models ； economic integration

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