中國地方政府徵地行為與農民維權行動：壓制與抗爭

本文從「土地財政」視角，分析中國地方政府徵地行為與農民維權之關連。地方政府利用產權模糊性、公共利益概念不明確及變通法律違法強制徵地，產生諸多流弊。基於競爭關係、財政需求及政績升遷需要，藉設置土地儲備中心實現財政目標。同時以化整為零方式審批土地，侵佔、截留、挪用補償費；利用司法行政化及地方化傾向，交叉運用合法暴力與黑惡勢力壓制農民維權行動。農民維權抗爭策略則是選擇運用弱者形象強化其行動之合法性與道德性，尋求社會菁英奧援、選擇關鍵時機維護、罷免官員及訴諸法律。

關鍵字

土地財政；土地徵收；公共利益；農民維權；地方政府

並列摘要

This paper, through the lens of land finance, analyzes the causal links between Chinese local government's land expropriation behavior and peasants' right self-protection movement. Many local governments take the advantage of the dual ambiguity of property rights and public interests as well as distort the application of expropriation laws so as to expropriate farm land. For the purposes of competition, financial needs, and performance and promotion of officials, these government behaviors include fractionizing the target land, embezzling, reserving, and distorting the compensation fees or cross-using legitimate violence and local gangsters to oppress peasants' self-protection movement. The counter strategies from peasants' side are to strengthen their legitimacy and high moral ground by amplifying disadvantageous image, seeking support from social elites, and recall officials, and appeal to the law.