2010公司與證券交易法發展回顧

Developments in the Law in 2010: Corporate Law and Securities Regulation

曾宛如(Wang-Ruu Tseng)

《臺大法學論叢》 40卷S期 (2011/10) Pp. 1877-1906

https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.2011.40.SP.12

摘要

公司法於2010年並未進行任何修訂，但實務上仍有許多值得探討之判決。這些重要之判決或涉及公司機關或其輔助機關之權限，如經理人在章程及契約之授權外，是否存有如同民法上所規定之經理人的法定權限；又監察人及不執行業務股東其監察權之範圍究竟何在等，均提供明確見解。然而，對於經營者之報酬，實務並未改變其先前對「報酬」所採之狹義解釋，以致於無法契合投資人對經營者報酬給付之看法，也與甫修正之證交法產生理念上的扞格。簡言之，投資人所在意者是公司給付各經營者之整體酬勞，而非名目。倘若報酬僅指每月固定之酬金，卻大開分紅及其他具有實質津貼給付之門，將形成股東會只對一年幾百萬之報酬有決定權；而將數千萬之其他「酬勞」交給董事會決定之現象。又證交法增訂薪酬委員會之後，若現行公司法仍不修改，亦將形成薪酬委員會所建議之給付內容分由股東會（或章程）及董事會決定之情形，顯有其不合理之處。相較之下，證交法於2010年修正頻仍，前後共計三次。三次修正中，除了增加證券商業務人員之消極資格及強制設置薪酬委員會外，尚有繼續公開之調整及內線交易構成要件之強化。就後者而言，某程度在於回應實務上適用時所生之困擾，並將資訊反應時間延長；然仍未解決我國之所以禁絕內線交易的理論之爭。在歸入權方面，法院首次就大股東與其配偶之計算提供模式；就不實財報所致之損害賠償，最高法院也有揚棄單純買賣價差法之意，均值得高度重視。

關鍵字

董事報酬 ； 監察權 ； 忠實義務 ； 雙重代位訴訟 ； 內線交易 ； 薪酬委員會 ； 短線交易歸入權 ； 不實陳述 ； 明確 ； 真實價差法

並列摘要

In 2010, the legislature did not make any changes to the Company Act; however, the Securities and Exchange Act was amended three times. Nevertheless, several corporate cases deserve discussion. It is held by the court that the provisions of the Civil Code are the supplements of the Company Act and thus managers have a certain legal authority to represent the company. Meanwhile, the court does not answer the issue of directors' remuneration correctly. The court has consistently opined that the word ”remuneration” is strictly construed to mean the consideration for directors' services (conceptually similar to laborage). However, from the perspective of investors, the total package that the company pays the director is the issue, rather than the monthly salary. Besides, in terms of how it identifies the payment as the remuneration, the court sometimes provides confusing interpretations. This situation has become worse as the Securities and Exchange Act has made it compulsory to set up the remuneration committee under the board of directors.Article 157-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act was amended again. It is suggested that some loopholes in the insider dealing regulation should be sealed. As a result, information should be precise in order to constitute inside information; it takes 18 hours for the market to fully access the disclosed material information and insiders are prohibited from trading within 18 hours after the disclosure is made. None of these, however, touch upon the core problem existing under the current legislation.It is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court for the first time provides the model to calculate the disgorgement of short-swing profits made by the shareholder and his (her) spouse (together holding more than 10% of the total issued shares). The Supreme Court is also inclined to abandon the method of calculating the damages whereby it simply deducts the selling price from the buying price.

並列關鍵字

director's remuneration ； supervisor's power ； fiduciary duty ； double derivative action ； insider dealing ； remuneration committee ； disgorgement of insider short-swing profits ； misrepresentation ； precise ； out-of-pocket method