國家障礙－中國大陸國有企業改革的分析視角

State Barriers: An Analytic Approach Toward the Reform of State-Owned Enterprise in China

宋國誠(Kuo-Chen Sung)

《中國大陸研究》 42卷3期 (1999/03) Pp. 3-23

https://doi.org/10.30389/MCS.199903_42(3).0002

摘要

本文綜合新制度經濟學和國家理論，論證中國大陸在準備根本「不變革」政治規則，僅僅在「實現公有制多樣化」的範圍內，乃至仍然高舉「四個堅持」的框架下，進行實質上不過是「產權修正」的局部補修，將無法徹底達到改造國有企業的目標。一種「以不觸動公有體制為前提」的改革，也不能導致有效率的產權改革。本文試圖證明，「增量－漸進」改革模式實際上是這種「低效改革」的理論概括。本文通過「國家障礙」－泛宏觀調控論、產權殘缺、僵持性談判、政治軟約束四個類型，論證了作為國家暴力潛能之一的「合法性潛能」(legitimacy potential)，正是國有企業改革的最大障礙。

關鍵字

國有企業 ； 交易成本 ； 制度變遷 ； 產權 ； 政府失靈 ； 帕累托改進 ； 諾思悖論 ； 租金最大化 ； 國控股公司 ； 矯正國家

並列摘要

This thesis synthesizes the economic theory of New Institutionalism and State theory to argue that the Mainland China still exerts its political rule of being ”unwilling to change.” From the limited sphere of ”carrying out the diversity within a state-owned system” to its persistent and high-sounding framework of ”Four Insistences,” in fact Mainland China engages in a partial amendment of ”estate correction,” a correction that fails to achieve the goal of a total reform in the state-owned enterprise sector. A reformation with a premise of being unable to alter the state-owned system will lead to an ineffective reform of property rights and will be destined to fail.
This paper also attempts to prove that the reformative mode of a ”gradual-increase” is the theoretical generalization of this ”low-effective reform.” Moreover, this thesis will present four types of ”State Barriers”-generalized macro control, absence of property rights, deadlocked negotiations, and political soft constraints-to reason that the ”legitimate violent potential” as one of the state violent potentials turns out to be the greatest obstacle to the reformation of the stated-owned enterprise.

並列關鍵字

state-owned enterprise ； transaction cost ； institutional change ； property rights ； state failure ； Pareto Improvement ； North's paradox ； profit-maximized ； state holding company ； revise state

參考文獻

Buchanan, James(1985).Liberty, Market, and State: Political Economy in the 1980s.New York:New York University Press.

North, D. C.(1990).Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.Cambridge; New York:Cambridge University Press.

North, D. C.(1981).Structure and Change in Economic History.New York:W. W. Norton ＆ Company.

Olson, M.(1971).The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

中國社會發展研究課題組(1997)。中國改革中期的制度創新與面臨的挑戰。社會學研究。1