現金增資下大股東的認股與監督決策

本文章是利用Maug（1998）的研究架構，重新探討機構法人股東在面臨現金增資案的稀釋股權壓力下，機構法人股東在參與增資及監督公司的決策之間的關連性。我們證明出對於大股東而言，參與增資比例會使得持有股份的增加，會讓大股東在增資後的監督意願強化，使得股東在市場上能獲得的交易利得有限。由於本文章的大股東為機構法人股東，這類型的股東所重視的是交易利得，而非以參與經營為目標，並且對於這類型的股東而言，由於經營公司非其所長，所以監督成本將會比一般的大股東高，所以機構法人股東為了維持獲利，則必須仰賴藉由交易所得到的交易利得，不能僅以監督後的資本利得為滿足，也因此對於機構法人股東而言，其則參與增資的意願便不強。

關鍵字

現金增資；機構法人股東；股東監督；市場流動性

並列摘要

This paper analyzes the strategies of owning the new stocks and monitoring the objective company. Under a case of seasoned equity offering, the large shareholders may be diluted; as a result they may consider participating the season equity offering, which is buying some new stocks. However, the large shareholders own more stocks, and the market is less liquid. Since the large shareholders cannot enjoy a trading profit in an illiquid stock market, they might not like to have too many new stocks of the objective company.

並列關鍵字

Seasoned equity offering ； SEO ； large shareholder ； monitor ； market liquidity

參考文獻

1. Admati, A. R.; Pfleiderer, P; and Zechner, J. （1994）“Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, no. 6, pp. 1097-1130

2. Asquith, P.; and Mullins, D. Jr. （1986）“Equity Issues and Offering Dilution” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 15, pp. 61-89

3. Berkovitch, E.; Narayanan, M. P. （1993）“Timing of Investment and Financing Decisions in Imperfectly Competitive Financial Markets” Journal of Business, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 219-248

4. Cooney, J. W. Jr.; and Kalay, A. （1993）“Positive Information from Equity Issue Announcements” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 33, pp. 149-172

5. Eckbo, B.E.; Masulis, R. W.; and Norli, O. （2000）“Seasoned Public Offerings: Resolution of the ‘New Issue Puzzle’ ” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.56, pp.251-291

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現金增資下大股東的認股與監督決策

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