論愛情：精神分析觀點

對佛洛伊德（Sigmund Freud）而言，愛情是建立在已失去之早年的原初滿足經驗。愛情生活只是此一原初滿足經驗的重新演出。因此，愛戀客體的「選擇」事實上並沒有選擇，而是只能以提供滿足的協助者為模型（依附型對象選擇），或以自身為範本（自戀型對象選擇）。然而這個宿命的愛情構想卻使得精神分析面臨了巨大的理論困難。若愛情沒有選擇，究竟如何解釋愛戀客體的誕生這一「愛情奇蹟」（miracle de l'amour）？拉岡（Jacques Lacan）在提出慾望的辨證之後，於1960-61年的第八講座《傳移》（Le transfert），藉由對柏拉圖《宴饗篇》的閱讀重新回到愛情的課題，並試圖從慾望結構的角度解決上述的難題。究竟慾望與愛情有何關係？為何與我們有愛戀關係的主體也同時是我們的慾望客體？對拉岡而言，澄清愛情的問題也等於是解釋了精神分析治療的「傳移之愛」的基礎，進而回答了他在1959-60年第七講座《精神分析倫理學》（L’éthique de lapsychanalyse）所提出之分析師的慾望與倫理問題。而另一方面，對愛情與慾望的分析也促使拉岡在1961-62 年的第九講座《認同》（L'identification）與1962-63年的第十講座《焦慮》（L'angoisse）中完整地提出了「慾望對象」（objet a）的概念。透過對佛洛依德與拉岡之文本的批評閱讀，本文將鋪陳精神分析理論中之愛情與慾望的問題，並由此探討拉岡「慾望對象」構想的特殊性。

關鍵字

佛洛依德；拉岡；愛；愛情隱喻；慾望；客體

並列摘要

This paper elaborates on the problem of love and desire in psychoanalytic theory via a critical reading of Freud's and Lacan's texts, in order to explore the particularity of Lacan's concept of ＂objet a＂. For Freud, love is based on the primary experience of satisfaction already lost in the very early years; one's love life merely replays such experiences of satisfaction. Therefore, the ＂choice＂ of the love-object is in fact no choice at all, but rather modeled either on the helping other that provides satisfaction (anaclitic type of object-choice), or on oneself (narcissistic type of object-choice). Yet, such a conception of fated love poses a huge theoretical challenge to psychoanalysis: If there is no choice in love, how can we explain ＂the miracle of love,＂ that is, the advent of love-object? In attempting to meet this theoretical challenge, Lacan brings his notion of dialectic of desire to bear on understanding love in the context of his reading Plato's dialogue, the Symposium, in Seminar VIII, Transference (1960-61). In this context, he explores several related questions: How is desire related to love? Why is the subject with whom we are in love also our object of desire?, etc. For Lacan, to clarify the mystery of love on the one hand amounts to explaining ＂transference love,＂ the basis of psychoanalytic treatment, and moreover solving the problem of the analyst's own desire and ethics (Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis [1959-60]); on the other hand, these analyses of love and desire prompt him to postulate the notion of objet a in Seminar IX, Identification (1961-62), and Seminar X, Anxiety (1962-63).