中共對美國戰略防禦計畫立場之研究

PRC's Position on U.S.A's Strategic Defense Plans

吳嘯吟(Hsiao-Yin Wu)

指導教授 ： 陳世民

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2004.01095

摘要

本論文共五章，全文約十五萬字。主要乃以歷史研究途徑及文獻分析法，就中共對美國發展戰略防禦的立場作一分析，藉以瞭解中共自90年代中期以來，極力要求鞏固《ABM條約》體制並反對美國發展國家飛彈防禦的原因。
本論文認為1972年美、蘇簽訂之《ABM條約》，由於相互保證摧毀及相互保證脆弱之戰略邏輯，對美、蘇本土不設防的結果，或閉陘丹@帶來間接利益，除提高中共核武嚇阻能力外，可能間接影響中共採重質不重量的核武發展模式。
80年代以後，中共逐漸獲致核武報復能力，並獲得威脅美國本土的核武實力，這亦改變70年代以來中、美戰略關係架構。1983年雷根宣布發展星戰計畫欲使核武器成為過時而無用之物，中共則因SDI可能引起美、蘇軍備競賽而加以反對，憂心戰略武器軍備競賽將降低本身的核嚇阻能力，並拉大與二強戰略力量的對比，因此中共反對任何形式的外空軍備競賽。
90年代中期以後，美國欲發展國家飛彈防禦系統以保衛本土免於遭受意外、非授權或蓄意的有限彈道飛彈攻擊。但中共認為，軍事上，NMD從結構、規模到防禦的重點是專門用來抵銷中國的核力量，而政治上，北京認為NMD體現美國鞏固全球霸主地位的決心，顯示對中國的敵視。
中共認為《ABM條約》對於維持戰略平衡與穩定，促進核裁軍及增進國際安全扮演重要之角色，除要求主要國家確保及強化《ABM條約》完整與嚴格之履行外，亦反對美、俄修改《ABM條約》。
2002年美國退出《ABM條約》，則令中共憂心美國可能將再度獲致對中共發動第一擊的能力。乃由於NMD可能嚴重抵銷中共現有約20餘枚ICBMs的有限核嚇阻力量，而使美國在危機時能對中共進行核訛詐。
雖然北京聲稱不會加入軍備競賽，但也不會讓本身安全利益受到影響，因此美國發展NMD及退出《ABM條約》將有可能影響中共正在進行的核武現代化計畫，中共有可能以增加核彈頭數量、發展反制措施、提高核武生存力等方式與NMD進行抗衡。在美國NMD發展與中共核武現代化雙重不確定性的情形下，除了可能引起東亞區域軍備競賽外，也有可能影響美國對台灣安全承諾的有效性。

關鍵字

中共核武 ； 反彈道飛彈條約 ； 戰略防禦 ； 星戰計畫 ； 國家飛彈防禦

並列摘要

The context of this thesis, composes of over 150 thousand words, consists of five chapters, and mainly discusses and analyzes the PRC’s position on the development of U.S. strategic missile defenses by document analysis and historical approach. This thesis intends to clarify the reasons that the PRC’s opposition to NMD and suggestion on consolidating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty regime.
The thesis considers the ABM Treaty, signed in 1972 by two superpowers, brought indirect benefits to the PRC for the strategic logics of mutual assured destruction and mutual assured vulnerability to make no defense to two superpower’s homeland. It might strength the deterrent of PRC’s nuclear force and affect PRC to adopt t the nuclear weapon development approach focused on quality rather than quantity indirectly.
After the early 1980’s, the PRC’s nuclear force gradually gained the ability to threat on U.S. territory and might also obtained the credible second strike capability. This also created the strategic relations framework between PRC and U.S.A.
As early as 1983, President Ronald Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to make the nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete; the PRC opposed SDI on the grounds that it would accelerate the arms race between USSR and U.S.A. The PRC feared SDI deployment would fuel strategic arm race, undermining China’s nuclear deterrent by causing China to fall even father behind the two superpowers. As a result, the PRC openly opposed any plan leading to a space arms race.
After the mid of 1990’s, the United States developed National Missile Defense system to defend the territory of the United Stated against limited ballistic missile attack whether accidental, unauthorized or deliberate. Militarily, the PRC believed that NMD is structured, sized and focused to neglect China’s nuclear forces. Politically, the PRC believed that NMD deployment amounts to a concrete manifestation of US determination to consolidate its position as a global hegemony and a clear manifestation of hostility toward China.
The PRC opposed any revisions to the ABM Treaty and consider the Treaty plays a very important role in maintaining the global strategic balance and stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and enhancing international security. The PRC also called for renewed efforts by each of the states parties to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty through full and strict compliance.
The U.S. withdrawal of the ABM Treaty in 2002 had cause the PRC to worry whether U.S will once again attain the ability of first strike towards PRC. U.S NMD will severely undermine the credibility of China’s limited strategic deterrence of approximately twenty intercontinental ballistic missiles and thus enable U.S to use nuclear blackmail against China in crisis.
Although Pekin stated it will not participate in an arms race with anybody, Pekin also reiterated it won’t allow its legitimate security interests to be compromised by any one. U.S missile defense plans and the associated withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could substantially influence China’s ongoing plans to modernize and expand its nuclear forces. In order to counter NMD, Pekin might build more missile warheads to overwhelm the defense, lower the observability of the warheads by applying counter measures or raise the survivability of its nuclear arsenal.
On the dual uncertainty of the developments U.S NMD and PRC’s nuclear modernization, it will not only cause regional arms race in East Asia but also influence the effective of U.S security commitment to Taiwan.

並列關鍵字

strategic defense ； NMD ； PRC’s nuclear force ； SDI ； ABM Treaty

參考文獻

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譚邦治（2000），〈綜覽ABM、TMD、NMD與MCTR（上）〉，《中國航天》，2000年第一期，2000年1月，頁41—43。

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