薪資上限與關係合約對管理人員薪酬之影響

The Impacts of Pay Caps and Relational Contracts on Managerial Compensations

陳建隆(Chien-Lung Chen)

指導教授 ： 周嗣文

國立清華大學/科技管理學院/經濟學系/博士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6843/NTHU.2013.00646

摘要

第一章：在2007年的金融危機之後，對營運表現欠佳之銀行或企業經理人的薪資設定上限，已成為一種懲戒經理人的普遍手段。本文建立了一個委託代理模型以研究薪資上限對經理人福利之影響。本文發現，薪資上限不僅無助於懲戒經理人之目標，反而將導致經理人的福利增加。具體而言，薪資上限越低，代理人之預期效用越高。此外，雖然契約資訊的改善有利於委託人，但卻可能增加薪資上限的邊際成本。
第二章：本文分析雇傭關係之價值對工作安全與升遷階梯之影響。在關係合約的分析架構之下，本文發現，僱傭關係的價值越低，工作的安全性越低，員工升遷的困難度越高，其面對的升遷階梯也越長。此外，當僱傭關係的價值低於某一臨界水準時，員工在獲得終身僱用後，仍須面對一額外的升遷階段。

關鍵字

委託代理模型 ； 道德風險 ； 薪資上限 ； 有限責任租 ； 關係合約 ； 工作安全 ； 升遷階梯

並列摘要

Chapter 1: Imposing caps on managers' pay has been a popular way to discipline managers of companies or banks that have got into trouble during the recent financial crisis. Using a small extension of the standard principal-agent model, we argue that pay caps will generally serve the opposite purpose because the agent is always better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that the agent's limited-liability rent increases as the pay cap become more stringent. The model also offers a characterization of the effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts. While improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it may increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.
Chapter 2: This chapter aims to investigate how the value of employment relationships affects job security and career paths faced by employees. In a model of relational contracting with limited liability, we show that when the value of the relationship between a principal and an agent decreases, the agent is more vulnerable to job loss and faces the prospect of a longer and harder promotion ladder to climb, both of which reduce the agent's limited liability rent. In particular, when the value is sufficiently low, an additional promotion phase after tenured emerges.

並列關鍵字

principal-agent model ； moral hazard ； pay caps ； limited liability rent ； relational contracts ； the value of relationships ； job security ； promotion ladders

參考文獻

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