隨著全球都市化程度越來越高,都市與區域的競爭也越來越激烈,當中租稅競爭等都市發展策略,往往造成「Race to the bottom」的現象,因此近年來許多學者紛紛關心租稅競爭所引發的諸多財政問題。 本研究以Dembour and Wauthy(2009)的模型作為基礎,加入Martin and Rogers(1995)將基礎設施分類為在地型基礎設施 (domestic infrastructure)以及國際型基礎設施(international infrastructure),來建構模型以了解其投資量與基礎建設類型之關聯性。透過廠商利潤函數與政府投資函數,計算其稅額與投資量的均衡解,並在均衡結果中,比較靜態分析出不同外溢效果下,基礎類型之投資量與稅額的變動情形,並以之為基礎了解基礎設施的投資量對於租稅競爭之影響。 最後,本研究加入基礎設施分類後發現當地方政府的決策方式不同時,外溢效果對於基礎設施的影響也會因為不同的賽局設定而有所不同,同時也會令租稅競爭有不同的結果,可能導致居民福祉的下降,或是「Free rider」坐享其成的地方政府。
As the level of urbanization become higher and higher, the competition between cities is more intense. The plan of development of city such as tax competition leads to a symptom called “Race to the bottom”. As a result, many scholars try their best to do the research of the financial problems that caused by tax competition. This paper is based on the mold of Dembour and Wauthy(2009), also added the mold of Martin and Rogers(1995). In order to build the mold to understand the connection of inventory amount and basic construction, we will divide basic facility part into domestic infrastructure and international infrastructure. Through vendor profit function and government investment function, we can calculate the tax and the balance point of investment and by this process; we can compare different spillover effect to know the alteration of basic type investment and tax. Through this, we can understand how basic facility investment affects tax competition. In conclusion, we find that when the local government has different plan, the influence of spillover effect, for basic construction, will be different. That will cause different result for tax competition and lead to the decrease of the profit or “Free Rider”, a government who sits idle and enjoy the fruits of others' work.