由於多數企業普遍存在股權集中之現象(La Porta et al,1999),形成控制股東愈有能力影響公司決策而侵害到小股東的財富,有關研究發現近年所爆發的公司虛增盈餘舞弊事件,其股份控制權與現金流量權產生偏離之情況越來越嚴重,易造成大小股東利益衝突現象,此問題正漸漸受到產官學界所重視,本研究以我國2000年至2009年上市上櫃公司為樣本,探討存在大小股東利益衝突時,掌控管理權之控制股東是否會因經營績效議題而從事盈餘管理行為?本研究以股份控制權與現金流量權產生偏離的比例代表大小股利益衝突之現象,並以本業營業利益計算資產報酬率作為公司經營績效之代理變數,實證結果顯示,當公司存在大小股東利益衝突時,且公司經營績效越差時,越會從事盈餘管理。
A procedure is The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the conflicts of the major and the minority shareholders is a significant factor in earnings management behavior. In addition, this study also examines firm performance have significant effects on earnings management behavior. The study collects research data from 2001 to 2009 of the public companies from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database and uses the discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings management. Corporate governance data are also obtained from TEJ to estimate the control rights, cash flow rights, and their differences. The empirical results indicate that when managers of the companies have more control rights than cash flow rights, which may results the conflicts of the major and the minority shareholders, managers are more likely to manage earnings. Such behavior is likely conducted for managers’ self-interests and will impair interests of minority shareholders. The results also show that firms engage in more earnings management as firm performance decrease. Besides, the results also show that as managers of the companies have more control rights than cash flow rights, and as firm performance decrease, managers engage in more earnings management behavior, that is the higher deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights and the worse of firm performance, the more earnings management will be conducted.