Dividend Policy, Earnings Management, and CEO Power

股利政策、盈餘管理與執行長權力

徐淑芳(Shufang Hsu) ； 陳煒朋(Wei-Peng Chen) ； 馮攸如(You-Ru Feng)

《財務金融學刊》 29卷4期 (2021/12) Pp. 31-77

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.202112_29(4).0002

摘要

This study investigates the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management and further examines the moderating effects of CEO power on this relationship. Empirical results show that firms with no-dividend payout have a significantly higher degree of earnings management. We also find that firms with higher CEO power are more inclined to perform earnings management when they are dividend non-payers. The further analysis explores CEO duality as a critical factor in the moderating effects of CEO power.

關鍵字

Dividend policy ； earnings management ； CEO power ； CEO duality

並列摘要

本研究主要探討股利政策與盈餘管理之間的關聯性，並分析執行長權力在此關係的調節效果。研究結果顯示，無發放股利的企業會有較高的會計盈餘管理程度，且執行長權力與盈餘管理程度成正比，顯示執行長權力具有調節效果。若進一步探究執行長權力中的三項指標，則可發現執行長雙重性是產生調節效果的主因。

並列關鍵字

股利政策 ； 盈餘管理 ； 執行長權力 ； 執行長雙重性

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